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Intrinsic value and love: three challenges for God's Own Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2017

ERIK J. WIELENBERG
ERIK J. WIELENBERG*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Asbury Hall, Depauw University, Greencastle, IN, 46135, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

I advance three challenges for the view Murphy advances in God's Own Ethics. The first two challenges target Murphy's claim that God does not have requiring reasons to prevent the suffering of rational creatures. I develop two arguments against that position, one based on the intrinsic value of human beings, the other based on the intrinsic badness of the suffering of rational creatures. My third challenge targets Murphy's account of God's contingent love for humanity. I seek to raise doubts about whether Murphy's picture is one in which it is true to say that God loves all human beings.

Type
Book Symposium
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 53 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 551 - 557
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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References

Davison, Scott A. (2012) On the Intrinsic Value of Everything (New York: Continuum).Google Scholar
Moore, George Edward (1903) Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Murphy, Mark C. (2017) God's Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar