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In Defence of Theism—A Reply to Kai Nielsen
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Extract
So much has been written in recent years about the philosophy of religion that one might have expected some definite pattern to be emerging from the discussion. In particular, one might have hoped that theists and non-theists would cease to adduce supposedly knock-down arguments against their opposite numbers. But there are still Thomists, commoner in the English-speaking countries than on the Continent of Europe, who seem to think that some purely logical process can settle the matter, and there are still positivists, again more especially in the English-speaking countries, who seem to think that God can be disproved. Professor Kai Nielsen's article does not make that claim in so many words, but he does conclude that the orthodox Christian's use of ‘God’ is the result of a mere confusion of mind and that for the philosopher the question of God should not arise at all or arises only to be dismissed. I hope I have not overstated Nielsen's conclusion (that would be a poor return for his kindness in allowing me a pre-view of his article); his treatment of the vast topic of the ‘human condition’ seems to me so extraordinary that I cannot help wondering whether I have misinterpreted it, most of all as it appears that he is not merely controverting Mr I. M. Crombie but also undertaking to dispose of theism altogether. He seems to think that ‘Flew's challenge’ is the decisive move in this debate, and that Crombie's two attempts to meet it are the only attempts which have to be considered. If this is really the case (as I shall have to suppose in what follows) I find it quite perplexing.
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References
page 37 note 1 It will be recalled that it appeared originally in University.
page 37 note 2 The Downside Review (Summer 1956), p. 188.
page 38 note 1 The Downside Review (Spring 1957), p. 168.
page 38 note 2 Religious Studies, no. 1, p. 48.
page 40 note 1 Crombie, as we have seen, does not make this claim in any forthright way.
page 41 note 1 Since I shall be disagreeing with him later about something else, I may be allowed to mention my complete agreement with Professor H. D. Lewis' position in the matter, as shown, for example, in the chapter on the soul in his new book Philosophy of Religion (English Univeristies Press, 1965).Google Scholar
page 42 note 1 Faith and Logic p. 66.
page 43 note 1 For example, in my contribution to Prospect for Metaphsics, ed. I. T. Ramsey (Allen and Unwin, 1961).Google Scholar Professor Campbell's, C. A. article ‘Self-Evidence’ in The Philosophical Quarterly (April 1960)Google Scholar is perhaps the most impressive statement of the case.
page 46 note 1 From the non-theist's own point of view, this absolute self-devotion which he feels called upon to practise is surely one of the most baffling features of his experience. A naturalistic explanation of it would seem to rob it of its essential character. And a non-naturalistic explanation which is also a non-religious one seems peculiarly unconvincing—a moral absolute requiring no anchorage in metaphysics or claiming to be itself an ultimate metaphysical conclusion seems peculiarly vulnerable to positivistic assaults. I shall refer to this again later.
page 46 note 2 Pp. 36–7. I have discussed this valuable work in The Tablet (Dec. 25, 1965) and have no space to repeat my comments here.
page 46 note 3 The Christian Universe pp. 17, 18.
page 47 note 1 Philosophy of Religion p. 113.
page 47 note 2 P. 118.
page 47 note 3 P. 263.
page 47 note 4 P. 262.
page 48 note 1 p. 263.
page 48 note 2 p. 263.
page 48 note 3 p. 265.