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How not to defend Positive Evidential Atheism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2016
Abstract
In ‘Undermining the case for evidential atheism’, Religious Studies, 48 (2012), 83–93, I challenged positive evidential atheism on the basis of some considerations from divine hiding, if God exists. Scott Aikin, in ‘Does divine hiding undermine Positive Evidential Atheism?’, Religious Studies, 52 (2016), 205–212, attempts to rehabilitate positive evidential atheism in the face of my challenge. I contend that his attempt fails, owing not only to his misunderstanding of my challenge from divine hiding but to also his defective positive case for atheism. The main defect is in his portrait of how evidence would count against God's reality. I explain how a serious epistemic problem for evidential atheism persists, relative to available relevant evidence, despite Aikin's proposed defence.
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