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Himma on the Free-Will Argument: a critical response
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 December 2012
Abstract
In two recent articles in this journal Kenneth Himma has launched an attack on what he describes as the ‘two versions’ of the Free-Will Argument, the first of which he describes as ‘the standard’ version and the second of which he identifies with Plantinga's Free-Will Defence in God, Freedom, and Evil (1974). In this article I argue for three main claims: (i) that Himma's objections against ‘the standard’ Free-Will Argument are directed at a straw man; (ii) that Himma's critique of Plantinga's Free-Will Defence is based on a misunderstanding; and (iii) that Himma's critique nevertheless is relevant to Plantinga's relatively neglected ‘Quantitative Free-Will Defence’ (also found in Plantinga's God, Freedom, and Evil), but fails to undermine this further defence due to its reliance on the unjustified assumption that the afterlife is irrelevant to the problem of evil.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012