^{page 153 note 2} ‘We must…deduce our classification of the art–type of the sublime from this … relation of the substantive unity regarded as significance to the phenomenal world’. Hegel, , The Philosophy of Fine Art, translated by Osmaston, F. P. B., G. Bell & Sons, London, 1920, Vol. II, 87.Google Scholar

^{page 153 note 3} Partly, in these notes.

^{page 154 note 1} This may perhaps be taken to suggest that Hegel admits the sublime also to the region of religious ideas, as distingusihed from that of religious poetry

^{page 154 note 2} This is our attempt to explain what follows immediately.

^{page 154 note 3} Hegel, , The Philosophy of Fine Art, Vol. II, 100.Google Scholar

^{page 154 note 4} If this account of the sublime is accepted, it at once becomes impossible to confuse it with the graceful, the pretty, or the merely pleasant.

^{page 154 note 5} Hegel, , op. cit., 102.Google Scholar

^{page 155 note 1} Hegel, , op. cit. 87, 98.Google Scholar

^{page 155 note 2} The reason why Hegel regards this as sublime is simply because it represents God's creation as spiritual, as utterly independent of the material.

^{page 155 note 3} Hegel, , The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 103.Google Scholar

^{page 155 note 4} ‘We have therefore not, as we found to be the view of Kant, to refer the sublime exclusively to the subjective content of the soul, and the ideas of reason which belong to it’ Ibid. 87,

^{page 155 note 5} Bradley, A. C.: Oxford Lectures on Poetry, Macmillan & Co., London, 1965, 52.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 1} Bradley, A. C.: Oxford Lectures on Poetry, 53.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 2} In the context of Hegel's treatment of the sublime, ‘absolute’ may be taken to stand for God. Where he discusses ‘the (true) art of sublimity, significance is said to consist in: ‘the One substance’, ‘God as absolutely spiritual’, ‘intuitive vision of the essence of God’ (Ibid. 97); or again in ‘the self–subsistence of One’ (98), ‘God’ (99), ‘His pure unity’ (100), and ‘the Absolute’. (104)

^{page 156 note 3} Hegel, : The Philosophy of Fine Art, Vol. II, 69.Google Scholar Hegel's word here is ‘Geist’ which means, in a fused way, that God is Spirit or Mind. Hegel is convinced that God ‘exists in the medium of mind, which is actual as intelligence, for us at any rate, only in the human self–consciousness’.

Bosanquet, B.: The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art, Kegan Paul, London, 1886, Prefatory Essay, XXXX.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 4} This should become clear when we turn to outline Hegel's account of ‘unconscious’ and ‘fantastic’ symbolisms.

^{page 156 note 5} Hegel, , The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 71. My emphasis.Google Scholar

^{page 156 note 6} This may here be explained by referring to a part of what Hegel says about the pyramids which are, in his view, the earliest instances of truly symbolical art. Though they certainly distinguish it clearly from the merely natural, the Egyptians are unable to make spirit appear ‘intrinsically free and living’. It does not yet call forth its own concrete embodiment. The significance, here, is primarily a Hades, not yet a life:

‘Consequently the embodiment for such an Inward still remains in relation to the determinacy of the same's content quite as much a wholly external form and envelopment. Such an external environment, in which an Inward reposes under a veil, are the pyramids.’ Ibid. 78.

^{page 157 note 1} Hegel, , The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 72.Google Scholar

^{page 157 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 157 note 3} Ibid. 69–70.

^{page 157 note 4} Ibid. 37.

^{page 157 note 5} Ibid. 42.

^{page 158 note 1} Hegel, , The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 36.Google Scholar

^{page 158 note 2} Ibid. 46.

^{page 158 note 3} Ibid. 29.

^{page 158 note 4} Cf. ‘Every determination of the Absolute is already essentially an inchoate movement in the direction of expression. For every determination is essentially distinction.’ Ibid. 67.

^{page 158 note 5} Ibid. 47.

^{page 158 note 6} Ibid. 53–4.

^{page 158 note 7} Ibid. 54. The reference, here, is to figures like Nataraja with four arms and Mahisha–mardini with ten arms. For a defence of such figures from the aesthetic point of view see Anand Coomaraswamy's. The Dance of Siva, Asia Publishing House, 1956, 96–101. This defence, however, does not directly consider Hegel's basic criticism that Hindu art has ‘little real kinship with either true symbolism or sublimity’. On the other hand, it is certainly some answer to Hegel's protest that this art ‘is equally remote from the true sphere of beauty’. Hegel, op. cit., 56.

^{page 159 note 1} Hegel, : The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 51.Google Scholar

^{page 159 note 2} Ibid. 49.

^{page 159 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 159 note 4} Of course, as a concrete existence the symbol possesses other qualities too which are not cognate to the spiritual. Otherwise, it would appear merely identical with, instead of as pointing to the significance, and so cease to be a symbol in the true sense. Ibid. 10.

^{page 159 note 5} I must point out that my purpose here is simply to state Hegel's criticism of Hindu art without accepting or questioning its tenability.

^{page 159 note 6} Ibid. 49–50.

^{page 159 note 7} Ibid. 48. Here, ‘the contradiction (is) merely affirmed as its genuine resolution’. Ibid.

^{page 160 note 1} Hegel, : The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 76.Google Scholar

^{page 160 note 2} Ibid. 77.

^{page 160 note 3} Ibid. 76.

^{page 160 note 4} The ‘Inward’ he is what the pyramid signifies, namely, the kingdom of death and the invisible. Ibid. 77.

^{page 160 note 5} Ibid. 75.

^{page 161 note 1} Hegel, : The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 75.Google Scholar

^{page 161 note 2} It may here be noted, in passing, that an important symbol of Egyptian art—one that is of very wide import—is ‘the image of the Phoenix, which is its own funeral pile, yet ever is rejuvenated out of the flames of its death and rises from the ashes’. Ibid. 73. I must also add that, to be true to Hegel's view, one should here speak of the persistence of spirit, not of life, through death. This is clarified a little later.

^{page 161 note 3} Ibid. 67.

^{page 161 note 4} Ibid. 68. (Emphasis mine.) Only in this sense. For, if we say categorically that the natural (simply) B falls away, we would in truth be referring to ‘the sublime,’ where alone the finite is shown irrevocably inferior or subject to the divine.

^{page 162 note 1} Hegel, : The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 69.Google Scholar

^{page 162 note 2} Hegel adds: ‘without being able successfully to solve it’. (Ibid. 74).

^{page 162 note 3} Yet, a stage, not a distinct kind. Thus, see:

‘We may … describe symbolic art throughout as a continuous war carried on between the comparative adequacy and inadequacy of its import and form; and the varied gradations of symbolic art are not so much kinds of specific difference as they are stages and phases of one and the same incongruity between the spiritual idea and its sensuous medium. Ibid. 27.

^{page 162 note 4} Ibid. 85.

^{page 162 note 5} At the stage of classical art, according to Hegel.

^{page 162 note 6} Ibid.

^{page 163 note 1} Hegel, : The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 31.Google Scholar

^{page 163 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 163 note 3} Ibid. 99.

^{page 163 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 163 note 5} Ibid. 103.

^{page 163 note 6} Ibid. 99.

^{page 163 note 7} Thus, the twleve steps or seven pillars of Egyptian architecture are symbolical. 7 stands for the planets, and 12 for the lunar revolutions. These numbers are here sacred, because they are present as determinants ‘in the great elementary relations’. Ibid. 72.

^{page 163 note 8} Ibid. 99.

^{page 164 note 1} Hegel, : The Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit. Vol. II, 86–7.Google Scholar

^{page 164 note 2} Ibid. 101.

^{page 164 note 3} Hegel himself does not say this about wonder in relation to the sublime. It is my idea, but it develops out of Hegel's own view.

^{page 164 note 4} Thus, see: ‘… The Mohamaden Persians, who openly and gladly surrender themselves with all their soul to the Divine influence, and indeed to everything which merits such devotion, while they do not fail to retain the freedom of independence in such surrender, and consciously to preserve the same in their attitude to the world and all that surrounds them.’ Ibid. 94

^{page 165 note 1} Hegel, : The Philosophy of Fine Art, op, cit., Vol. II, 98.Google Scholar

^{page 165 note 2} Ibid. 86.

^{page 165 note 3} Ibid. 98.

^{page 165 note 4} Ibid. 88. My emphases.

^{page 165 note 5} Ibid.

^{page 165 note 6} Ibid. 90.

^{page 165 note 7} Bhagavda Gita, 7^th Adhyäya.

^{page 165 note 8} The Sanskrit word here is ‘Jyotisham. (Gita, X, 21) Hegel translates it as ‘stars’. Thu Philosophy of Fine Art, op. cit., 92.

^{page 166 note 1} Gita: 10^th Adhyaya.

^{page 166 note 2} Hegel, , op.cit., 90.Google Scholar

^{page 166 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 166 note 4} See Gita: II, 14; and VII, 7.

^{page 166 note 5} Hegel, , op. cit., 90.Google Scholar

^{page 166 note 6} Ibid. 88.

^{page 166 note 7} This seems to be Hegel's translation (Ibid 91) of the 12^th sloka of 7^th Chapter of the Gita.

^{page 166 note 8} Gita: VII, 7.

^{page 167 note 1, 2 & 3} Hegel, , op. cit., 93.Google Scholar

^{page 167 note 4} Ibid. 93–4.

^{page 167 note 5} Ibid. 94.

^{page 167 note 6} Ibid. 97.

^{page 168 note 1} Hegel, , op.cit., 96.Google Scholar

^{page 168 note 2 & 3} Ibid. 95. Hegel hastens to contrast this with the Western attitude:

‘When we of the West, on the contrary, refer in our poetry to roses, nightingales, or wine, and such matters, we do so in a wise much nearer to prose. The rose merely serves us for ornament, as in the expression, among others, ‘garlanded with roses’. If we listen to the nightingale it is but to follow the bird with our own emotions; we think of the grape-juice, and call it “the breaker of our cares” ’.

^{page 168 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 169 note 1} Hegel, op. cit., 104.Google Scholar

^{page 169 note 2} The reference here is to his well-known cry of anguish: ‘Mo sum kaun kutila khal kāmī.

^{page 169 note 3} Cf. also: ‘I desire to record all my past vileness and the carnal corruption of my soul: not that I love the retrospect, but that I may love Thee, O God’.

The Confessions of St Augustine, translated by Bigg, C., Methuen & Co., London, 1929, 69. Emphases mine.Google Scholar

A spiritual confession is not a matter of ordinary discomfort. Its feature is the experience of ‘earthquake mutterings and menaces of a violated conscience’; and its expression in words is often characterised by a fair measure of the qualities called ‘hupsos’, ‘Schemata’ ‘phrasis’ and ‘sunthesis’. See the description of his ‘spiritual condition’ by James, Henry in Schneider's, H. W.A History of American Philosophy, the Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1946, 192.Google Scholar

^{page 170 note 1} ‘For that which has been brought into being is his work, possesses no consistency as apart from him’. Hegel, , op. cit., 101.Google Scholar

^{page 170 note 2} Ibid. 98.

^{page 170 note 3} A further development of this idea, ‘that light, heavens and clouds … are … merely an external vesture… in the service of God’ is the extolment of his wisdom ‘which has ordained all things. The springs which leap from their sources, the waters, which flow between the hills …; all these hath the Lord made.’ Ibid. 103.

^{page 171 note 1} Hegel, , op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 171 note 2} Ibid. 104.

^{page 171 note 3} Ibid. 100.

^{page 172 note 1} This is how I interpret the following utterance of his: ‘That mode of giving form, which is annihilated by the very thing which it would set forth, so that it comes about that the exposition of content affirms itself as that which renders the exposition null and void is in fact the sublime.’ Ibid. 87.

^{page 172 note 2} My suggestion here is but tentative. I see it clearly, as I did not while writing this paper, that in the Orissi style of Indian classical dance, the tilt is frequently employed, as atibhang, only for a decorative purpose.