^{page 325 note 1} Hartshome and Pike suggest that the formula ‘that than which none greater can be conceived’ should be interpreted as ‘that than which none more worthy of worship can be conceived’. Hartshorne, Charles, Anselm's Discovery(LaSalle, Illinois, 1966), pp. 25–26Google Scholar; and Pike, Nelson, God and Timelessness (London, 1970), pp. 149–160.Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 2} These phrases are from Hick, John, Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963), PP. 13–14.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 3} In speaking of ‘beliefs about God’ I have in mind those typical of Western religions. I shall construct my account of worship in these terms, although the account will be adaptable to other forms of worship such as Satan-worship (see footnote I, pp. 331).

^{page 327 note 1} For example, one religious believer who thinks that his conduct must be very different on account of his belief is Geach, P. T.: see his essay ‘The Moral Law and the Law of God’, in God and the Soul (London, 1969).Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 2} Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (Berkeley, 1967). Edited by Bartlett, Cyril, from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees, and James Taylor.Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 3} For example, Rhees, Rush, in Without Answers (London, 1969), ch. 13.Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 1} Wittgenstein, p. 53.

^{page 328 note 2} Wittgenstein, pp. 54–5.

^{page 328 note 3} The whole subject is explored in detail in Nielsen, Kai, ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism’, Philosophy, XLII (1967), PP. 191–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 331 note 1} This account of worship, specified here in terms of what it means to worship God, may easily be adapted to the worship of other beings such as Satan. The only changes required are (a) that we substitute for beliefs about God analogous beliefs about Satan, and (b) that we understand the ritual of worship as committing the Satan-worshiper to a role as Satan's servant in the same way that worshiping God commits theists to the role of His servant.

^{page 333 note 1} Cf. Pike, Nelson, ‘Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin’, American Philosophical Quarterly, VI (1969), pp. 208–9Google Scholar; and Martin, C. B., Religious Belief (Ithica, 1964), ch. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 2} This suggestion might also throw some light on the much-discussed problem of how we could, even in principle, verify the existence of G. Sceptics have argued that, even though we might be able to confirm the existence of an all-powerful cosmic superbeing (if one existed), we still wouldn't know what it means to verify that this being is divine. And this, it is said, casts doubt on whether the notion of divinity, and related notions such as ‘Christ’ and ‘God’, are intelligible. (Cf. Nielsen, Kai, ‘Eschatological Verification’, The Canadian journal of Theology, IX, 1963.) Perhaps this is because, in designating a being as God, we are not only describing him as having certain factual properties (such as omnipotence), but also ascribing to him a certain place in our devotions, and taking him as one to be obeyed, worshipped, praised, etc. If this is part of the logic of ‘God’, then we shouldn't be surprised if God's existence, in so far as that includes the existence of divinity, is not entirely confirmable-for only the ‘factual properties’ such as omnipotence will be verifiable in the usual way. But once the reason for this is understood, it no longer seems such a serious matter.Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 3} Camus, Albert, The Rebel, translated by Bower, Anthony (New York, 1956), p. 62.Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 1} Kant, Immanuel, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Beck, Lewis White (New York, 1959), P. 44.Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 1} See above, section 4.

^{page 335 note 2} Of course we cannot ever know that such a being is perfectly good, since this would require an examination of all his actions and commands, etc., which is impossible. However, if we observed many good things about him and no evil ones, we would be justified in putting forth the hypothesis that he is perfectly good and acting accordingly. The hypothesis would be confirmed or disconfirmed by future observations in the usual way.

^{page 336 note 1} Cf. Geach, pp. 124–125: ‘The rational recognition that a practice is generally undesirable and that it is best for people on the whole not even to think of resorting to it is thus in fact a promulgation to a man of the Divine law forbidding the practice, even if he does not realise that this is a promulgation of the Divine law, even if he does not believe there is a God.’

^{page 337 note 1} A number of people read earliet versions of this paper and made helpful comments. I have to thank especially Kai Nielsen, William Ruddick, Jack Glickman, and Steven Cahn.