Much recent Kierkegaard scholarship has paid particular attention to various aspects of the literary form of his authorship, such as the significance of his writing under various pseudonyms. The focus has been upon ‘style’ as much as ‘content’; the ‘how’ as much as the ‘what’ of Kierkegaard's writing. Within this context, James Conant has argued, in a series of articles, that there are important parallels between the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (authored by the Kierkegaardian pseudonym Johannes Climacus) and Wittgenstein's Tractatus. However, Conant argues that these parallels have been misunderstood by previous commentators. The main aim of this article is to challenge Conant's argument that the Postscript should be read as containing ‘nonsense...simple, old garden variety nonsense’. This, we shall see, relies upon a particular view of the significance of Climacus's ‘revocation’ of the text. The commentators whom Conant wants to criticize allegedly hold that the Tractatus and the Postscript provide ‘essential preliminary noise’ to the realization that those issues which really matter – in particular, ethics and religion – cannot be spoken of. These commentators, according to Conant, insist on the existence of a kind of speech ‘that lacks sense while still being able to convey volumes’.