^{page 263 note 1} Lewis, H. D., ‘Immortality and Dualism’, in Reason and Religion ed. by Brown, Stuart (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 282.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 2} Descartes' argument appears in numerous places, including the Discourse, the Meditations, The Search for Truth, Objections and Replies, and his correspondence. Among the best treatments of his argument for dualism is Wilson's, MargaretDescartes (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 1} Geach, Peter, God and the Soul (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), chapter two.Google ScholarFindlay, J. N., ‘Identity and Identification’, Religious Studies XX, no. 1 (03 1984).Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 2} Pollock, John, Knowledge and justification (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).Google ScholarBoyd, Richard, ‘Materialism without reductionism: what physicalism does not entail’, in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, edited by Block, Ned, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).Google Scholar In ‘Counterparts of persons and their bodies’ David Lewis also seems to allow that persons may have final ‘ghostly stages’, journal of Philosophy, LXVIII (1971), p. 203.

^{page 265 note 1} Black, Max, ‘The Identity of indiscernibles’, reprinted in Universals and Particulars, edited by Loux, Michael (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1976).Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 1} Cf. Purtill's, Richard ‘Disembodied survival’, Sophia, XII no. 2 (07 1973).Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 2} The following works defend the existence of haecceities: Chisholm's, RoderickPerson and Object (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1976)Google Scholar, Plantinga's The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978)Google Scholar, and Brody's, BaruchIdentity and Essence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).Google Scholar Haecceities are criticized by Chisholm in later works, notably The First Person (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 1} Levin, Michael, Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem (Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 79.Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 1} Cf. Butler, Joseph, ‘Of Personal Identity’, in Body, Mind, and Death, ed. by Flew, Antony (New York: Macmillan, 1964)Google Scholar and Reid, Thomas in An Inquiry into the Human Mind (various editions).Google Scholar Reid and Butler held that a person does not have any parts. Furthermore, they contended that the identity over time of an object which does not change its parts, indeed which has no parts, is more intelligible than supposing an object is the same over the course of its gaining and losing parts. Is your car the same after you have changed all its parts? Strictly speaking, is it precisely the same after you have changed even a single part? Philosophers continue to debate these issues, e.g. Identity and Individuation, ed. by Munitz, Milton (New York University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 1} Pollock, , pp. 140, 141.Google Scholar

^{page 273 note 1} Price, H. H., ‘Survival and the Idea of “Another World”, in Smythies‘ Brain and Mind (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965).Google Scholar Price writes: ‘Mental images, including dream images, are in a space of their own. They do have spatial properties. Visual images, for instance, have extension and shape, and they have spatial relation to one another. But they have no spatial relation to objects in the physical world’ (p. 12).

^{page 274 note 1} Allaire, Edwin, ‘Bare Particulars’, reprinted in Universals and Particulars, p. 300.Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 2} Ibid. p. 289.

^{page 274 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 274 note 4} Long, Douglas, ‘Particulars and Their Qualities’, reprinted in Universals and Particulars, pp. 310–30.Google Scholar