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³ One can impose rules on oneself, but in such a circumstance one can hardly be said to be constrained by them.

⁴ Traditionally, God cannot change His mind, as it were, since He is held to be immutable. ‘Eternity principally characterizes God who is utterly unchangeable’ – Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, 10. But that doctrine is consistent with divine commands changing from time to time, since God can eternally will change while not changing His will.

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⁶ Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, 19.6. The reference is taken from Psalm 115: 3.

⁷ ‘A standard objection to this theory – let's call it the arbitrariness objection – has long been that it cannot escape the following dilemma. On the one hand, if God has no reason for what He commands, then His commands – and hence morality as well, according to the theory – are fundamentally arbitrary. On the other hand, if God does have reasons for what He commands, then it is those reasons rather than divine commands on which morality ultimately depends. The first horn of the dilemma is said to be too implausible to be acceptable; the second, to abandon the divine-command theory itself.’ Sullivan, S. J., ‘Arbitrariness, divine commands, and morality’, International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, XXXIII (1993), 33–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar; emphasis mine.

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¹⁸ Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia–IIae, 94.5.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Op. cit. 93.4.

²¹ Acts 7: 52.

²² Romans 9: 20–1.

²³ P. Abelard, Super Epist. ad Rom. 2.6.

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²⁵ There is an interesting example of what the imagination can produce in the way of rightful torture in Orson Scott Card's novel Xenocide (London, 1991).Google Scholar

²⁶ Aquinas, op. cit. Ia–IIae, 186.

²⁷ Mahoney, J., The Making of Moral Theology (Oxford, 1987), p. 179.Google Scholar

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²⁹ Romans 3:8.

³⁰ Aquinas, op. cit. Ia–IIae, 341.

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³² Gunton, op. cit. p. 57.

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