Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T02:56:32.430Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Design Argument: Hume's Critique of Poor Reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

J. C. A. Gaskin
J. C. A. Gaskin
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Dublin
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In an article in Philosophy (1968, pp. 199–211) R. G. Swinburne set out to argue that none of Hume's formal objections to the design argument ‘have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument’ (p. 199). This, he maintained, is largely because Hume's criticisms ‘are bad criticisms of the argument in any form’ (p. 206). The ensuing controversy between Swinburne and Olding1 has focused upon the acceptable/unacceptable aspects of the dualism presupposed in Swinburne's defence of the design argument; upon whether any simplification is achieved by reducing scientific explanation to agent explanation; and upon the problems which arise from taking a man's acting upon his body (or the material universe within his reach) as the analogy for understanding a disembodied agent acting upon matter. In this article I shall refer to the Swinburne-Olding controversy when appropriate but my main concern is to return to Swinburne's original article and argue, seriatim, that Hume's individual criticisms of the design argument are for the most part a great deal more powerful than Swinburne allowed. I shall contend that cumulatively they destroy the design argument as any sort of rational foundation for theistic belief. But first I shall indicate briefly the character of the argument together with one or two of the distinctions and refinements in terms of which it has been found helpful to carry on the discussion in recent years.

Type
Research Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 1976 , pp. 331 - 345
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 331 note 1 The four articles are: Swinburne, R. G., ‘The Argument from Design’, Philosophy (1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Olding, A., ‘The Argument from Design – a Reply to R. G. Swinburne’, Religious Studies (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Swinburne, , ‘The Argument from Design – a Defence’, Religious Studies (1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Olding, , ‘Design – a Further Reply to R. G. Swinburne’, Religious Studies (1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar I refer to the fast of these as ‘Swinburne’ followed by the page. I refer to Swinburne's article in Religious Studies as ‘Swinburne's Defence’.

page 331 note 2 Hume, , Dialogues on Natural Religion, ed. Kemp Smith, N. (2nd edition, Edinburgh, 1947).Google Scholar Referred to as Dialogues followed by the page.

page 333 note 1 Although Hume does not have the theory of natural selection at hand he does make a suggestion which comes remarkably close to anticipating the theory as an objection to the teleological argument: ‘It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain know how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form?’ (Dialogues, 185).

page 333 note 1 Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Hendel, C. W. (New York, 1955).Google Scholar Referred to as Enquiry followed by the page.

page 339 note 1 Hume speaks of order and final causes (purposes). Thus in this instance his objection is directed at both the regularity and the teleological arguments. In my discussion I largely ignore the teleological argument. This is because (a) in the Dialogues the context of the remark is concerned with discussion of the origin of order and no further reference is made to purpose; and (b) Hume has no need to try to show that purpose in nature is not specially related to an agent cause (a difficult thing to do if purpose in nature is admitted) since he has an argument (see p. 333n) to explain the appearances of purpose as the consequence of non-purposive regularities.

page 341 note 1 Since writing the above paragraphs my attention has been drawn to the very interesting remarks concerning the distinction between natural and artificial objects in Jacques Monod's Chance and Necessity (London, 1972), pp. 15–31.Google Scholar In particular Monod notes difficulties in finding criteria which clearly distinguish between living objects and artifacts. His remarks do not, I think, invalidate what I say. But they do suggest that the subject deserves more lengthy discussion than I have given or can allow it in a paper of the present scope.

page 345 note 1 I am most grateful to Professor E. J. Furlong and N. Steele for their patient and helpful criticisms of an earlier version of this paper.