^{page 281 note 1} Sharma, B. N. K. calls Vādirāja, who wrote a monumental defence of the Dualist Vedānta in a work called Yuktimallikā, ‘the most popular and enthusiastically applauded writer in Dvaita literature’ (A History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature. II [Bombay: Booksellers' Publishing Co., 1961], 192).Google Scholar

^{page 282 note 1} See Iyer, M. K. V., Advaita Vedānta According to Śankara (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), pp. 117–18.Google Scholar

^{page 282 note 2} See Śankara, , The Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyana with the Commentary of Śankara, trans. George Thibaut, I (New York: Dover Publications, 1962), 1960.Google Scholar

^{page 283 note 1} None of Vādirāja's many works has been translated before. His corpus is a goldmine for the Sanskritist with philosophical interests. I have translated only the first section (or 421 verses) of the Nyāyaratnāvali.

^{page 283 note 2} Naraka, usually translated ‘hell’, is one of the devices by which souls which have led wicked lives are justly punished. As in Christianity, it is popularly regarded as a fiery place where the guilty are tormented. Most Hindus, however (and Vādirāja's own school is a notable exception), regard hell as temporary – really more of a purgatory than a hell.

^{page 283 note 3} Brhadaranyaka Upanirad 4.1.7, in Radhakrishnan, S., The Principal Upanisads (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953), p. 252.Google Scholar

^{page 284 note 1} See Dasgupta, Surendranath, A History of Indian Philosophy, II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 76–7Google Scholar, for a detailed explanation of the relation of consciousness to antahkarana.

^{page 284 note 2} Actually Vādirāja asks the non-dualist to consider whether a man or an arrow, not a can, is able to suffer. But since the verse in Sanskrit is especially effective because narānām (men) and Śarānām (arrows) rhyme, I have rendered the rhyme rather than the literal meaning into English.

^{page 284 note 3} Narain, K., A Critique of Mādhva Refutation of the Śānkara School of Vedānta (Allahabad: Udayana)Google Scholar

^{page 285 note 1} ibid. p. 73. See Dasgupta, , Indian Philosophy, IV (1949), 236Google Scholar, for a shorter exposition of the same argument, and p. 243 for a non-dualist counter-argument.

^{page 286 note 1} Non-dualists often speak of ‘the buddhi’, by which they usually mean the willing or affirming capacity of the mind. At other times they speak of ‘a buddhi’, by which they mean a momentary particularization of the buddhi; in this sense, Dasgupta tells us, ‘Buddhi, or intellect, means the mental state [italics mine\ of determination or affirmation (niścayātmika antahkarana-vrtti)’, and is synonymous with the better known Antahkarana-vrtti, , or ‘mental modification’ (Indian Philosophy, II, 75).Google Scholar

^{page 286 note 2} Sankara of course holds that the soul is ultimately all-pervading and infinite, for it is ultimately only the ātman.

^{page 287 note 1} An Introduction to Śankara's Theory of Knowledge (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1962), p. 101.Google Scholar

^{page 287 note 2} ibid. pp. 101–2.

^{page 288 note 1} The position that Vādirāja is attacking here resembles Nāgasena's in the Questions of Milinsda (see Stryk, Lucien, ed., World of the Buddha [York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969], pp. 89–99).Google Scholar

^{page 288 note 2} Advaita Vedānta, p. 117.

^{page 289 note 1} Śankara, , Commentary, II, 64.Google Scholar

^{page 289 note 2} ibid.I, 379, 381.

^{page 290 note 1} ‘There is a general belief amongst many that monism of Śankara presents the final phase of Indian thought…But the readers of the present volume… will realize the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the dualistic position’ (preface by Dasgupta, , Indian Philosophy, IV, viii). Mysticism East and West (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p. 33 (title of chapter 2).Google Scholar