^{page 37 note 1} In a later paper, ‘Ultimates and a Way of Looking’, Lewis says on this point: ‘On the other hand, nothing seems plainer to me than that seeing, hearing, pondering, resolving etc., while they have behavioural and dispositional aspects, are essentially non-extended, non-physical on-goings. The simplest stock example is having a pain. However ‘physical”, the pain itself is not just a state of my body, but what I feel. But if I am asked to adduce a reason for this I am at a loss; and I marvel that anyone should request a reason for what seems to me so evident in itself. The appeal to our consciousness of pain, or any other experience, seems quite conclusive here, but if it is denied and arguments requested to show why the pain we admittedly do have, and our thoughts about it, must be thought altogether different from physical processes, then one is put out of court before the only possible plea can be made. The thoughts that I put on paper now cannot themselves be located though much that concerns and conditions them can. If this is not plain in itself I do not know what is, and I could hardly fail to do my case the gravest injustice if I took up the challenge to adduce further arguments for what I maintain.’ Persons and Life after Death, pp. 29–30.Google Scholar

^{page 38 note 1} The Self and Immortality, p. 11.Google Scholar

^{page 38 note 2} Op. cit. p. 20.Google Scholar

^{page 38 note 3} Op. cit. p. 22.Google Scholar

^{page 39 note 1} A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by Selby-Bigge, L. A., book 1, part iv, section vi, and appendix, p. 633.Google Scholar

^{page 39 note 2} Op. cit. appendix, pp. 635–6.Google Scholar

^{page 39 note 3} Op. cit. pp. 31–2.Google Scholar

^{page 40 note 1} Op. cit. p. 43.Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 1} Religious Language, and, ‘The Systematic Elusiveness of “1”‘, in Philosophical Quarterly, no. 20 (July 1955).Google Scholar

^{page 41 note 2} Since self is dependent on by, if there is personal survival after death there would need to be a body of some kind, though not the body in which the self is presently contextualized.

^{page 42 note 1} [Dr Scott Dunbar raises a very crucial issue here for a view like my own. A very similar point is made by Professor Bertocci, Peter in Religious Studies (December 1979Google Scholar). I have offered him an answer in very brief outline. But I hope to be able to present a satisfactory answer in my The Elusive Self, a sequel to The Elusive Mind, which is nearing completion for publication by Macmillans. I certainly have not the least doubt that the question is a crucial one and I am grateful to Dr Scott Dunbar for his forcible presentation of it. H.D.L.]

^{page 43 note 1} Op. cit. p. 72Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 1} Op. cit. pp. 7516.Google Scholar

^{page 45 note 1} ‘Street Haunting’ by Woolf, Virginia, in Collected Essays, iv, 155–6.Google Scholar

^{page 45 note 2} Le Temps Retrouvé by Proust, Marcel, translated by Blossom, Frederick A. as The Past Recaptured, pp. 212 13.Google Scholar