No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Classical Theism and the Doctrine of the Trinity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Extract
It is well known that Augustine, Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas participated in a tradition of philosophical theology which determined God to be simple, perfect, immutable and timelessly eternal. Within the parameters of such an Hellenic understanding of the divine nature, they sought a clarification of one of the fundamental teachings of their Christian faith, the doctrine of the Trinity. These classical theists were not dogmatists, naively unreflective about the very possibility of their project. Aquinas, for instance, explicitly worried about and fought to dispel the seeming contradiction between the philosophical requirement of divine simplicity and the creedal insistence on a threefold personhood in God.1 Nevertheless, doubts abound. Philosophers otherwise friendly to Classical Theism (CT) still remain unsure about the coherence of affirming a God that is at once absolutely simple and triune.2 A less friendly critic has even suggested that the theory of divine simplicity pressured Augustine and his medieval followers away from recognizing that real complexity within the life of God which Trinitarianism expresses.3
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994
References
1 Aquinas, Thomas, Compendium of Theology, I, tr. Vollert, C. (St Louis: B. Herder, 1947), chs. 51–2Google Scholar (hereafter, Compendium).
2 See Kretzmann, N., ‘Trinity and Transcendentals’, in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, ed. Feenstra, R. J. & Plantinga, C. Jr (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 105Google Scholar, n. 37, and Stump, E., ‘Hamartia in Christian Belief’, in Hamartia (The Concept of Error in Western Thought), ed. Stump, D. V. et al. (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1983), pp. 131–48.Google Scholar
3 Morris, T. V., Our Idea of God (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), pp. 181–2Google Scholar. Hughes, C. (On a Complex Theory of a Simple God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989))Google Scholar has argued that Aquinas's theory of the Trinity is internally incoherent precisely because he tries to make it mesh with his account of divine simplicity.
4 See Gelber, H. G., Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335 (University of Wisconsin, Madison: Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1974).Google Scholar
5 For statements of this construal of the doctrine of divine simplicity, see Mann, W. E., ‘Divine Simplicity’, Religious Studies, XVIII (1982), 451–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kretzmann, N., ‘Abraham, Isaac, and Euthyphro: God and the Basis of Morality’, in Hamartia (The Concept of Error in Western Thought), pp. 27–50Google Scholar; and Stump, E. & Kretzmann, N., ‘Absolute Simplicity’, Faith and Philosophy, II (1985), 353–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 Aquinas, Compendium, I, ch. 50.
7 For development of the notion of ‘wild quantification’, see Fred Sommers, The Logic of Natural Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 15–31.Google Scholar
8 This aspect of the notion of divine simplicity is derived from Mann, who provides the necessary references. See ‘Divine Simplicity’, pp. 451–4.
9 See his ‘Abraham, Isaac, and Euthyphro: God and the Basis of Morality’, pp. 43–6.
10 Accordingly, Mann (‘Divine Simplicity’, pp. 453–5) rejects the Augustinian–Anselmian extension of the theory of divine simplicity.
11 See n. 7, above.
12 (1) reads: Something that Perfect Life is identical to–is such that it is identical to Perfect Knowledge. The reasoning indicates that ‘is identical to’ expresses a symmetrical relation and that the grammatical subject of a sentential string need not be its logical subject.
13 See Stump, E. & Kretzmann, N., ‘Absolute Simplicity’, Faith and Philosophy, 1 (1985), 356–7Google Scholar, and Morris, Our Idea of God, p. 115.
14 Gelber, Logic and the Trinity, pp. 6, 196 and 230. In section II below, however, the truth of the (implicitly parsed) premisses of the expository syllogism [B] will be disputed from the standpoint of a refined CT; see n. 39.
15 Mann, ‘Divine Simplicity’, pp. 454–5.
16 Ross, J., ‘Comments on “Absolute Simplicity”’, Faith and Philosophy, II (1985), 386.Google Scholar
17 The Rule of Distribution operative here is: ‘[[S] (P)] and ([S] (Q))’ is equivalent to ‘[S] ([P] and (Q))’. Bold brackets, parentheses, and sometimes suppressed italics indicate the main logical subjects, predicates and syntactical devices of any simple or compound proposition. The bracketed and parenthetical phrases in turn can be composed of complex subjects and predicates which are also operated upon by sometimes suppressed syntactical devices. To avoid clutter, often only the main subjects, predicates, and syntactical devices of a string will be indicated. At times, however, the distinction between such finegrained parsings as ‘Every [S] ((is not) a [P])’ and ‘Every [S] ((is) not a [P])’ will be crucial.
18 This necessary semantical truth says: Whatever is completely red and is identical to A – is such that the redness of it is identical to the colour of A.
19 A – is such that the redness of it is identical to the colour of A.
20 Whatever is identical to the existence of God and is identical to the power of God – is such that the power of it is identical to the existence of God.
21 God – is such that its power is identical to the existence of God.
22 Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, 3 Vols., tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1947), 1, 13, 11Google Scholar (hereafter, ST). The Latin text and English translation of the Summa Theologiae contained in the various Blackfriars volumes published by McGraw-Hill have also been consulted and will be used from time to time. See also, Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, tr. Pegis, A. C. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962)Google Scholar, I, ch. 22 (hereafter, SCG).
23 Anselm, St, Proslogion, tr. Charlesworth, M. J. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), chs. II and III, pp. 116–19.Google Scholar
24 SCG, 1, ch. 11.
25 Damascene, St John, Writings, tr. Chase, F. H. Jr. (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1958), p. 189.Google Scholar
26 An identity endorsed for CT by Mann, W. E., ‘Epistemology Supernaturalized’, Faith and Philosophy, I (1985), p. 452.Google Scholar
27 ST, 1, 2, 1c. Aquinas actually refers only to ‘God exists’ (‘Deus est’).
28 ST, 1, 10, 3.
29 Aquinas, ST, 1, 3, 5 and SCG, 1, ch. 25.
30 Alvin Plantinga's rejection (in Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), pp. 26–61) of the theory of divine simplicity assumes at crucial junctures that it would be absurd for any theist to deny that God is a person.
31 See Burrell, D. B., ‘Distinguishing God from the World’, in Davies, B., ed., Language, Meaning and God (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1987), pp. 89–90Google Scholar, n. 13, and B. Davies, ‘Classical Theism and the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity’, in ibid. p. 66.
32 See Kelly, J. N. D., The Athanasian Creed (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1964), pp. 17–19Google Scholar, for the Latin text and English translation.
33 Plantinga, C. Jr ‘Social Trinity and Tritheism’, in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, p. 40.Google Scholar
34 Hughes, G. E., ‘The Doctrine of the Trinity’, Sophia, 11 (1963), 7.Google Scholar
35 Of course, if ‘is’ in ‘F is God’ and ‘S is God’ functions as a copula allowing the simple conversion of ‘F’ and ‘S’ with ‘God’, then both ‘S is F’ and ‘F is S’ are validly inferred.
36 We thus depart from Aristotle who in the Categories (The Complete Works of Aristotle, I, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 1b2–9; 2a13–15)Google Scholar seems to preclude the possibility of proper names functioning solo in the predicate position.
37 Parry, W. T. and Hacker, E. A., Aristotelian Logic (Albany: State University of the New York Press, 1991), pp. 216–17 and p. 517Google Scholar, n. 2.
38 ST, 1, 39, 6, ad 2.
39 Thus neither of the premises in Argument [B] in Section I above, if parsed as ‘[This divine essence] (is God the Son)’ and ‘[This divine essence] (is God the Father)’, can be true. With ‘God the Son’ and ‘God the Father’ as their respective logical subjects, these premisses can be true. With this latter parsing, however, Argument [B] is no longer valid.
40 Leibniz, G. W., Logical Papers: A Selection, tr. Parkinson, G. H. R. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 13.Google Scholar
41 Following a gloss given by Mates, B., The Philosophy of Leibniz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 180–1.Google Scholar
42 The major (G.1) reads: Whatever is such that it is now A and Paul is now A – is similar to Paul. (18.1) claims: Peter – is such that it is now A and Paul is now A.
43 (19) claims: God the Father – is such that both it is identical to God and God the Son is identical to God. (20) claims: God the Son – is such that both God the Father is identical to God and it (that is, God the Son) also is identical to God.
44 Whatever is such that it is identical to God and God the Son is identical to God – is the same God as God the Son.
45 Martinich, A. P., ‘Identity and Trinity’, Journal of Religion, LVIII (1978), 175–76.Google Scholar
46 The conclusion in the next sub-section with regard to the Principle of the Transitivity of Identity will reveal why for CT the near-Sabellian (21) does not entail the Sabellian claim ‘[F] ((is) [S])’.
47 Martinich, ‘Identity and Trinity’, pp. 175–6, notes the triple conjunction as the standard resolution and rejects it in favour of a resolution which sees ‘is identical to’ as an essentially incomplete expression which needs to be relativized.
48 Martinich, , ‘Identity and Trinity’, pp. 178–80.Google Scholar
49 See Hughes, C., On a Complex Theory of a Simple God, pp. 237–9.Google Scholar
50 An excellent discussion of the nature of relational phrases in the context of syllogistic inferences is provided in Daniel Merrill, D., Augustus De Morgan and the Logic of Relations (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), pp. 89–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
51 See Hughes, G. E., ‘The Doctrine of the Trinity’, pp. 7–8.Google Scholar
52 For a statement of the Social Trinitarian view of predication concerning the persons of the Trinity, see Plantinga, Cornelius Jr., ‘The Threeness/Oneness Problem of the Trinity’, Calvin Theological Journal, XXIII (1988), 37–53.Google Scholar
53 ST, 1, 39, 7, ad 1.
54 See, for example, Hilary, St of Poitiers, The Trinity, tr. McKenna, S. (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1954), Bk 11, 8–9.Google Scholar
55 See N. Kretzmann, ‘Trinity and Transcendentals’, pp. 81–7.
56 ST, 1, 28, 3, ad 1.
57 C. Hughes, On a Complex Theory of a Simple God, p. 197.
58 This is the approach seemingly favoured by Peter Van Inwagen, ‘And Yet They Are Not Three Gods But One God’, in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, p. 269, for removing the opposition between the ‘paradoxical’ sentences ‘God is begotten’ and ‘God is not begotten’. These are respectively reduced to the claims ‘(∃x) (x is God & x is begotten)’ and ‘(∃x) (x is God & ˜ x is begotten)’.
59 Through the suppressed quantifier in ‘[God the Father] (person)’, the general name ‘person’ is shown to be predicated of God the Father.
60 C. Hughes (On a Complex Theory of a Simple God, p. 227) suggests that Aquinas rejects the principle that if a and b are the same secundum rem, ‘a’ and ‘b’ may be truth-preservingly intersubstituted. For us this indicates an inchoate Thomistic rejection of the necessity of the principle: ‘If [[a] (is identical to b)] (a = b)’.
61 See Wolterstorff, Nicholas, ‘Divine Simplicity’, in Philosophical Perspectives, v: Philosophy of Religion 1991, ed. Tomberlin, J. E. (Atascadero, California: Ridgeview, 1991), pp. 541, 551.Google Scholar