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Christ's freedom: Anselm vs Molina

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2016

KATHERIN A. ROGERS
KATHERIN A. ROGERS*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Both Molinism and Anselmianism attempt to preserve libertarian freedom for created agents as well as robust divine sovereignty. The two issues intersect in addressing the puzzle of Christ's freedom: If God is necessarily good, how can God Incarnate be free? Anselm answers: while human agents need options for our choices to be up to us, Christ inevitably chooses rightly with perfect freedom. I defend Anselm's answer against a general criticism and then argue that Anselm's position is preferable to the Molinist solution which has recently been championed by Thomas P. Flint.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 52 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 497 - 512
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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