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Aspirational theism and gratuitous suffering

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2019

JIMMY ALFONSO LICON
JIMMY ALFONSO LICON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD20742, USA
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Philosophers have long wondered whether God exists; and yet, they have ignored the question of whether we should hope that He exists – call this stance aspirational theism. In this article, I argue that we have a weighty pro tanto reason to adopt this stance: theism offers a metaphysical guarantee against gratuitous suffering (i.e. God would not permit gratuitous suffering). On the other hand, few atheist alternatives offer such a guarantee – and even then, there are reasons to worry that they are inferior to the theistic alternative. Given this difference, we have a strong pro tanto, but not all-things-considered, reason to adopt aspirational theism.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 287 - 300
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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