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The Argument from Design—a Reply to R. G. Swinburne1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

A. Olding
Affiliation:
Lecturer in Philosophy, Macquarie University

Extract

Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the argument from design is in many respects the most impressive, as everyone remarks that Kant remarked. Certainly it is an argument which seems to have appealed to the popular imagination and even today does not lack philosophical proponents. The purpose of the present paper is to examine a recent formulation of the argument. In particular I shall be concerned to bring into the open its dualist assumptions and to show how these militate against its general plausibility.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1971

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References

page 361 note 2 Swinburne, R. G., ‘The Argument from Design’, Philosophy, 07 1968, pp. 199200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Page references in the text refer to this article, except where otherwise stated.

page 363 note 1 Bertocci, Peter Anthony, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1951), p. 220.Google Scholar

page 364 note 1 Brougham, Henry Lord, A Discourse of Natural Theology, Showing the Nature of the Evidence and the Advantages of the Study (New York: William Jackson, 1855).Google Scholar

page 365 note 1 Aquinas, St Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 42.Google Scholar