^{page 325 note 1} Hume, David, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and the Posthumous Essays (ed.), Popkin, Richard H. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982), p. ix.Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 2} Fox, Marvin, ‘Religion and Human Nature in the Philosophy of David Hume’, in Process and Divinity (ed.), Reese, William L. and Freeman, Eugene (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1964), pp. 561–77.Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 3} Psalm 8. 4–6, New American Standard Bible (Carol Stream, IL: Creation House, 1973).

^{page 325 note 4} Book I part III ends with chapter XVI ‘Of the reason of animals’. Book II part I ends with chapter xii ‘Of the pride and humility of animals’. Book II part II ends with chapter xtt ‘Of the love and hatred of animals’.

^{page 326 note 1} Fox, , p. 566.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 2} Hume, David, ‘Of the reason of animals’ in A Treatise of Human Nature analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge, second edition revised text and notes by P. M. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 176–9.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 3} See below page.

^{page 326 note 4} A proposition P is epistemically self-defeating if it is such that no one can reasonably believe it.

^{page 326 note 5} See below pages 11 and 12.

^{page 327 note 1} Compare Psalm 8. 6.

^{page 327 note 2} Ontological superiority is relative to some ontological hierarchy. Being A is ontologically superior to being B relative to ontological hierarchy C if being A belongs to a kind which is above the kind that being B belongs to hierarchy C. In Thomas Aquinas' ontological hierarchy infinite spirit is higher than rational finite spirit. Thus on that hierarchy God is ontologically superior to any angel.

^{page 327 note 3} A being A is functionally superior to a being B if B's function is subordinate to A's function. In the biblical account of the created order humans are functionally superior to plants (cf. Genesis I. 29). It is proper for humans to use plants for food; it is not proper to use humans for fertilizer.

^{page 327 note 4} The theist is not committed to the claim that ‘Only humans are created in the divine image’: for a theist might maintain that ‘Only human animals are created in the divine image, but angels are created in the divine image as well.’

^{page 327 note 5} Aquinas seems to think that Psalm 91. 11 teaches that angels protect humans. See Summa Contra Gentiles, book 3, part I, chapter 80, paragraph 16.

^{page 327 note 6} My point is theoretical. For the present purposes it does not matter whether or not angels exist. 1 refer to Aquinas' views regarding angels to illustrate the point that ontological superiority is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for functional superiority.

^{page 327 note 7} See note 3 on p. 325.

^{page 329 note 1} Hume seems to suggest that every such action should be attributed to reason. Compare the following remark,

We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are guided by reason and design, and that' tis not ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining of pleasure, and avoiding pain…The resemblance betwixt the actions of animals and those of men is so entire in this respect, that the very first action of the first animal we shall please to pitch on, will afford us an incontestable argument for the present doctrine. (T. p. 176.)

^{page 329 note 2} Hume states,

Tis certain, that not only in philosophy, but even in common life, we may attain the knowledge of a particular cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment, and after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstance. (T. p. 104.).

^{page 331 note 1} ‘Reason’, in this context, is, I take it, not equivalent to ‘reflection’ but rather functions like the imagination. Reason understood as reflection is different from the imagination.

The imagination tells us, that our resembling perceptions have a continued and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, and different from each other. (T. p. 215.)

Reason understood as an instinct is like the imagination. Reason so understood ‘carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities’, (T. p. 179); the imagination, guided by universal principles, unites simple ideas (T. p. I o). For an elucidation of the various ways in which Hume employs reason and imagination, and the connections between those various usages, see Yandell, Keith E. ‘Hume on Religious Belief’, in Hume: A Re-evaluation (eds). Livingston, D. and King, J. T. (New York, Fordham University Press, 1976) p. 122, note 20.Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 2} Recall that Plantinga argues that the criteria offered for properly basic beliefs by medieval and modern foundationalists are self-referentially incoherent. Further, it is not clear what the necessary and sufficient conditions for properly basic beliefs are. But in the absence of such necessary and sufficient conditions it does not follow that one cannot be justified in accepting some beliefs as properly basic. A sufficient condition for accepting a belief as properly basic is that belief is appropriately grounded. Grounding is a notion that Plantinga considers ‘hard to state’. Difficult as it may be to provide a construal of grounding, Plantinga offers the following,

The central point here, however, is that a belief is properly basic only in certain conditions; these conditions are, we might say, the ground of its justification and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself.

Plantinga, Alvin, ‘Rationality and Religious Belief’, in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (ed.), Cahn, Steven M. and Shatz, David (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 272.Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 1} Plantinga, , p. 272Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 2} With the resources of Reformed epistemology it seems that the Humean can claim that her beliefs regarding animal rationality are explained nonepistemically (epistemically, she is a sceptic regarding the external world, other minds, etc.) and that she is justified in holding her beliefs.

^{page 332 note 3} Perhaps upon seeing a salmon swim upstream to spawn, a non-Humean may come to believe that the behaviour of the salmon is arational. Given Reformed epistemology, prima facie, it is plausible to think that she would be justified in accepting that belief as properly basic.

^{page 332 note 4} Note that there is a difference between S being justified in believing p, and S's belief p being justified. S can be caused to believe p and be justified in believing p. But S's belief p is not justified if it can only be explained in terms of causes as opposed to reasons.

^{page 333 note 1} The phrase ‘and only correctly explained nonepistemically ’ precludes overdetermination, i.e. the possibility of a belief being correctly explained both epistemically and non-epistemically.

^{page 333 note 2} Compare the remarks cited in note 4 on p. 325.

^{page 334 note 1} Midgley, Mary, Beast and Man The Roots of Human Nature (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 55.Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 2} Midgley, , pp. 52–3.Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 3} Hansell, Michael H., Animal Architecture and Building Behavior (London: Longman, 1984), p. 214.Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 4} Hansell, , p. 215.Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 5} Hansell, , p. 215.Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 1} I am grateful to Keith Yandell and David Carlson for their critical comments and suggestions.