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The X-claim argument against religious belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2016

STEPHEN LAW
STEPHEN LAW*
Affiliation:
Heythrop College, University of London, Kensington Square, London W8 5HN, UK
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article outlines an argument against religious belief: the X-claim argument. The argument is novel at least in the sense that it has not yet been clearly articulated or addressed before in the philosophical literature. However, the argument is closely related to two more familiar varieties of argument currently receiving philosophical attention, namely: (i) arguments from religious diversity, and (ii) naturalistic debunking arguments (e.g. Freudian, Marxist, and evolutionary). I set out the X-claim argument, show that it has some prima facie plausibility, distinguish it from these other two arguments with which it might easily be confused, and, finally, explain why it has some significant advantages over these more familiar arguments against religious belief.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 15 - 35
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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