^{Page 151 note 1} Farrer, Austin, The Glass of Vision (Glasgow, Dacre Press, 1948), p. 42.Google Scholar

^{Page 151 note 2} Op. cit., p. 43.

^{Page 151 note 3} Crombie, I. M., ‘The Possibility of Theological Statements’, in Faith and Logic, ed. Basil, Mitchell (London, Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 68.Google Scholar

^{Page 152 note 1} In this paper I use image, words, religious language, more or less interchangeably. Images are mental pictures of concrete earthly existents but these are normally conveyed by language so that we have verbal pictures. In this paper we are not considering (except peripherally) religious language of the conceptual sort that is found especially in theological definitions.

^{Page 153 note 1} P. 142

^{Page 153 note 2} Evans, Donald, The Logic of Self-Involvement (London, S.C.M. Press Ltd. 1963).Google Scholar

^{Page 154 note 1} Op. cit. p. 131

^{Page 154 note 2} Op. cit. pp. 131–2.

^{Page 155 note 1} Op. cit. p. 132.

^{Page 155 note 2} I am not clear why Evans chose the term ‘parabolic’ to designate those onlooks where a comparison is being made between two things (I look on God as a Father) not in terms of analogies but in terms of similar attitudinal responses. Was it simply to indicate a kinship with Farrer's and Crombie's use of parable ? If so, it is misleading because they use parable in a comprehensive sense, much as I use image in this paper. Their parables are metaphysical parabolic onlooks. Evans uses the term ‘parabolic’ to indicate one aspect of the total image, viz. the attitudinal. Would it not have made for clarity simply to use the term attitudinal to designate onlooks held on the basis of similar attitudes? That ‘parabolic’ by itself, to designate Evans’ technical meaning of ‘attitudinal’, is confusing is seen by this need to conjoin the two terms; e.g. ‘Divine transcendence can be expressed in anthropomorphic language, provided that this language is interpreted parabolically, attitudinally’ (p. 226). And again, ‘…. the modern interpreter needs to discard the literal comparison so that he retains only the attitudinal, parabolic meaning’ (p. 226, footnote). This usage also lands us with some awkward constructions, e.g. ‘A parable provides a metaphysical parabolic onlook’ (p. 223).

But perhaps Evans’ intention in using the term ‘parabolic’ is simply to stress the indirect quality of statements about God. Parables, in ordinary usage, are not objective descriptions of something; rather they illumine their referent only allusively and tangentially. Similarly, the onlooks under discussion are not objective designations of God; instead they predicate something about God indirectly by pointing to an appropriate existential attitude of the believer. Hence, on the model of parables which are inherently characterized by indirect reference, such onlooks may fittingly be called ‘parabolic’.

^{Page 156 note 1} Op. cit. p. 133.

^{Page 156 note 2} Op. cit. p. 254–5.

^{Page 156 note 3} Op. tit. p. 70–1.

^{Page 156 note 4} Since I have noted above that one of the sources of the problem of religious language is the transcendence of God, I ought to indicate briefly Evans’ treatment of images whose purpose is specifically to draw attention to divine transcendence. Images that express God's transcendence, Evans calls ‘transcendental’. For example, images suggesting omnipresence and omniscience are parabolic because they express a resemblance of appropriate attitude, i.e. the attitude of openness towards one who knows one's thoughts is appropriate to God. But God is transcendent; therefore, towards him the attitude of openness must be unlimited. Such images which convey the sense of God's transcendence by evoking an unlimited response on our part, e.g. unlimited glorification, unlimited submission, unlimited trust, express transcendental metaphysical, parabolic onlooks.

^{Page 157 note 1} Symbolism and Belief (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1938), p. 256.Google Scholar

^{Page 157 note 2} Op. cit. p. 257.

^{Page 158 note 1} Op. cit. p. 318.

^{Page 160 note 1} Cf. Crombie, op. cit. p. 79. ‘The critic is not only asked to conceive of the world as if it were the work of a supreme intelligence, but also to believe that it is the work of a supreme intelligence. Creation, Redemption, Judgment are not to be accepted as illuminating fables, but affirmed as faithful parables. That these parables deepen our understanding of the world is one of the grounds for affirming them; it is by no means the whole content of that affirmation. To believe these doctrines is not only to believe that they illuminate the facts which come within our view, but also to believe that they do so because they are revelatory of facts which lie outside our view.’

^{Page 161 note 1} Op. cit. p. 134.

^{Page 161 note 2} Op. cit. p. 200.

^{Page 161 note 3} Op. cit. p. 202.

Op. cit. p. 330.