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Topic neutrality and the mind–body problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2000

CLIFFORD WILLIAMS
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, Deerfield, IL 60015

Abstract

In a previous paper I argued that there is conceptual parity between Christian materialism and Christian dualism because nonmatter is neutral with respect to thinking and feeling – it might do these but it also might not. This undermines the explanatory power of immaterial souls. J. P. Moreland responded by saying that dualists reject this neutral conception of souls: souls are not generic immaterial substances, but consist of a special kind of nonmatter, namely, nonmatter whose essence it is to think and feel. I reply that conceptual parity can still be maintained: Christian materialists can claim that brains are not neutral either, but consist of a special kind of matter, namely, thinking and feeling matter. So there is parity whether one adopts a topic-neutral approach or an essentialist approach.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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