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Sceptical theism and divine truths

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2011

AARON SEGAL
AARON SEGAL*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana46556
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called ‘noseeum inference’. Erik Wielenberg (2010) has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. Thus, sceptical theists need to give up their argument against the noseeum inference or accept the conclusion that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. I claim that sceptical theists need not face such a difficult choice because the argument that Wielenberg offers is not as plausible as their argument against the noseeum inference.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 85 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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