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A reply to Schlesinger's theodicy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2007

JEREMY GWIAZDA
JEREMY GWIAZDA
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Graduate Center, CUNY, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016
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Abstract

In Religion and Scientific Method, George Schlesinger presented a strikingly original theodicy. In this paper, I explain the strategy underlying Schlesinger's argument. I then present a parallel argument to indicate the weakness of Schlesinger's theodicy. Finally, I show that Schlesinger's theodicy assumes a false principle, and therefore fails.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , December 2007 , pp. 481 - 486
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

Notes

1. George Schlesinger Religion and Scientific Method (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1977), chs 9–10. References in the text are to this work. An earlier version of Schlesinger's argument appeared in idem ‘The problem of evil and the problem of suffering’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1 (1964), 244–247Google Scholar. Subsequent to Religion and Scientific Method, Schlesinger's theodicy was published in idem A New Perspective on Old-Time Religion (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 53–76; and idem ‘Is God obliged to make us happy?’, in Steven M. Cahn and David Shatz (eds) Questions About God: Today's Philosophers Ponder the Divine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37–46.

2. Schlesinger Religion and Scientific Method, 59.

3. Ibid., 60. Schlesinger explicitly identifies the state where all of one's needs are taken care of with the state of maximum happiness.

4. Ibid., 62.

5. Ibid.

6. In a slightly different context below, we return to this point that Happiness is maximizable. There I present a quote of Schlesinger's that also indicates that Happiness is maximizable.

7. Schlesinger Religion and Scientific Method, 62.

8. ‘Slightly dirty’ is contrasted with, and means, ‘not perfectly clean’. That is, one piece of dust renders a room ‘slightly dirty’.

9. Schlesinger Religion and Scientific Method, 61.

10. Ibid., 75–76.

11. Truth and Happiness are both maximizable obligations, which presents no problems, as I am no longer trying to mirror Schlesinger's argument involving one maximizable and one unmaximizable obligation. The question we are investigating is: when are obligations combined into multi-variable functions?

12. Schlesinger Religion and Scientific Method, 15. Schlesinger again rejects the idea that God must decrease Happiness to achieve greater good when he considers the soul-making theodicy. Schlesinger writes, ‘This solution is based on the claim that there are certain very valuable human qualities, the possibility of which God could not have ensured without permitting suffering … . God, wanting a better world, had to allow suffering’; ibid., 43. Schlesinger goes on to reject this view; ibid., chs 6–8.

13. I wish to thank Professor Steven Cahn for his invaluable guidance and encouragement.