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Religious Statements and the World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

W. J. Wainwright
W. J. Wainwright
Affiliation:
Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois
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Extract

In the past few years philosophers of religion and theologians have devoted much attention to the status of religious statements. There are three main positions: (1) The statements as generally understood are (false) empirical statements. The people who make them have either made honest mistakes (they are unaware of the counter evidence) or they are irrational. This view may be coupled with the claim that religious language can be reconstructed in such a way that we may continue to use it and yet avoid making false assertions. (The position Braithwaite outlines in An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief seems to be close to this.) (2) The statements are not empirical and are therefore not significant. (3) The statements are not empirical— common sense and science are irrelevant to the truth and falsity of religious claims—and yet they are significant.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , October 1966 , pp. 49 - 60
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1966

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References

page 55 note 1 We may want to say that it is really only the accepted historical implications of these stories which are taken as reasons for first order type I statements. As such, a story can function as a reason only if some of its historical implications are accepted. And yet it would seem that we ought not to say this, for many who would refuse to accept any of the historical implications of the creation story still offer it as backing for first order type I statements. ‘But how can a mere story be a reason for anything?’ We might say that a mere story is not a reason for first order type I statements but is rather a poetic way of expressing attitudes occasioned by the acceptance of first order type I statements. We might say that a mere story is poetry in that it calls attention to patterns in the world which are taken as evidence for first order type I statements. (What is a pattern? What patterns?) We might say that the story is not a mere story but a symbol. (A symbol for what though: for anything intelligible?) We might say that in fact most believers do take the creation story as having historical implications, and add that when someone rejects the historical implications and still uses the stories as backing for first order type I statements he has failed to notice that one consequence of his rejection is that he can no longer use the story as a reason. The last three alternatives seem to be most plausible.

page 56 note 1 MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘The Logical Status of Religious Beliefs’, in Metaphysical Beliefs (SCM Press).Google Scholar

page 56 note 2 This last condition is essential. I am strongly inclined to think that this claim (something is holy) will, in the last analysis, be justified by an appeal to religious experience. For example, the Bible or the Church may be experienced as ‘the cradle in which Christ is laid’. But though this appeal is, I think, essential, it presents numerous difficulties of its own and I shall not discuss it here.