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Religion within the Limits of the Quest for the Highest Good

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

G. L. Doore
G. L. Doore
Affiliation:
Visiting Scholar, University of Oxford
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Extract

(1) In this paper I want to discuss a certain way of understanding the concept of religion which I think is more satisfactory than other ways that have often been proposed in the literature, arguing, in brief, that the way to an adequate understanding does not lie through an analysis of the concept of ‘worship’ or ‘the worshipful’ or any notions derivative from these, as some writers have maintained, but instead through a comparative analysis of the various concepts of a ‘highest good’, thought of as a final salvation or ‘liberation’ for its seekers, found in the major religions. I shall also discuss some of the advantages of this way of regarding religion, as well as what I take to be certain of its consequences for the philosophy of religion. The discussion will also lay the groundwork for a pragmatic justification of religious belief (where ‘religious belief’ is understood in the way to be suggested), and will, I hope, help to shed light on the question of what would constitute a religiously satisfactory notion of the highest good.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 345 - 359
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

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References

page 345 note 1 On Selfhood and Godhood (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), p. 237.Google Scholar

page 346 note 1 Campbell's approach is a paradigm example of this type. See ibid. pp. 231 ff.

page 346 note 2 Ibid. p. 248.

page 346 note 3 Campbell's approach is, of course, not universal. Basil Mitchell has pointed out to me that Ninian Smart (e.g.), in many of his works, maintains that there are two main types of religious experience, the mystical and the numinous. I shall not have space to discuss the merits of Smart's approach, but it can be said in favour of the approach I shall recommend in its stead that it succeeds, like Campbell's, in reducing all religion to one general form (thus having the advantage of economy), while avoiding Campbell's problems.

page 347 note 1 Ibid. p. 250.

page 348 note 1 My information about Soto Zen is derived mainly from conversations with the late Suzuki Roshi and other Zen Buddhists, although from descriptions I have read it appears that the Tibetan Buddhist ‘Mahāmudra’ meditation is essentially the same as Soto Zen. Cf. Chang, Garma C. C., The Teachings of Tibetan Yoga (New York, 1963).Google Scholar

page 348 note 2 By ‘liberation’ or ‘enlightenment’ I shall refer to that which is denoted by the term ‘moksa’ in Hinduism and nirvāna in Buddhism. Contrary to some writers, I shall interpret both of these words as having the same referent, since I do not think it is plausible to claim that the Buddha regarded nirvāna as something different from what is called ‘moksa’ in Yoga, Vedanta, etc. See my article, ‘The “Radically Empiricist” Interpretation of Early Buddhist Nirvāna’, Religious Studies XV (1979).Google Scholar

page 349 note 1 The summum bonum is however, an attentuated concept of heaven in certain important respects. It does not, for example, include the ideas of (a) love, and (b) worship. Nevertheless, the ‘happiness’ component of the summum bonum might be interpreted as involving these, or at any rate being compatible with them. Indeed, it might be argued that, since an individual without love could not be supremely happy, love is necessarily involved in the concept.

page 349 note 2 Tr. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).

page 350 note 1 Incidentally it should be noted that something analogous to the concept of a ‘moral world order’ is found in the Indian notion of rta, or cosmic harmony.

page 351 note 1 See Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), part III, ch. 1.Google Scholar

page 351 note 2 Translated by Mishra, Ramurti S. (London: Lyrebird, 1972).Google Scholar

page 352 note 1 See Stace, W. T., Mysticism and Philosophy (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960)Google Scholar, for a detailed argument for this claim. I agree with Stace as against Zaehner (Mysticism Sacred and Profane), that differences in descriptions of the mystical consciousness by Eastern and Western mystics are best accounted for by cultural factors that condition the descriptions rather than by any fundamental difference in the nature of the Eastern and Western mystical experience.

page 353 note 1 This is the type of doctrine found (e.g.) in Shankara's Advaita Vedānta.

page 354 note 1 I say ‘existential realization’ because it is claimed that a mere intellectual understanding of the concept of enlightenment is not sufficient to constitute enlightenment.

page 357 note 1 Cf. Swinburne's, Richard ‘principle of credulity’, in The Existence of God (Oxford, 1979).Google Scholar

page 358 note 1 I say ‘moral and spiritual perfection’ because there seems to be a distinction between the two, though it is hard to formulate precisely and there is no doubt some overlap. However, if it is granted that the ultimate spiritual goal should be construed as involving the notion of an ego-transcendent ‘mysticism’, as previously suggested, ‘spiritual development’ would need to involve at least an increasing ability to silence the mind, which mystics describe as a precondition of the mystical experience; and it would probably involve much else besides.