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Pruss's ontological arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2009

GRAHAM OPPY
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton Campus, Wellington Road, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia e-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

First, I suggest that it is possible to make some further improvements upon the Gödelian ontological arguments that Pruss develops. Then, I argue that it is possible to parody Pruss's Gödelian ontological arguments in a way that shows that they make no contribution towards ‘lowering the probability of atheism and raising the probability of theism’. I conclude with some remarks about ways in which the arguments of this paper can be extended to apply to the whole family of Gödelian ontological arguments.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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