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Propositional faith and trustworthiness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2022

Allan Hazlett Open the ORCID record for Allan Hazlett [Opens in a new window]
Allan Hazlett*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA
*
E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

I argue that propositional faith presupposes trustworthiness, in this sense: faith that p is fitting only if the one in whom you have faith to bring it about that p is trustworthy to bring it about that p. In defence of this, I argue that propositional faith is a species of interpersonal faith and that interpersonal faith presupposes trustworthiness. I also discuss some of the consequences of my thesis for theistic propositional faith.

Keywords

faithtrustpropositional attitudestheism
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 59 , Special Issue 3: Normative Appraisals of Faith in God , September 2023 , pp. 434 - 447
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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