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Presuppositions of Religious Dialogue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

J. N. Chubb
Affiliation:
Formerly Professor of Philosophy, Bombay University

Extract

I would like to explain the point of view from which this paper is written. And this in itself will be a difficult task. In a religious dialogue we could be concerned in some way with questions which arise as a result of serious differences in doctrines between adherents of different religions or religious faiths. The ensuing debate or dialogue could take the form of an argument conducted from points of view that are distinctly partisan. If two doctrines are or are taken to be in head-on collision with each other by those who accept these doctrines, the holder of one doctrine would argue with the holder of the other doctrine with the object of showing that he is partly or wholly in error. If two statements both claiming to have truth-value are, or are taken to be, inconsistent with each other, then it is clear that one or both of them are or must be taken to be partly or wholly false. To attempt to show by marshalling reasons that the proposition inconsistent with that which one holds is wholly or partly false is what I mean by the partisan approach. The approach in a dialogue is partisan even if truth is claimed and the opposing ‘error’ exposed by reference to authority; for so long as there is to be a dialogue the setting up of a particular authority or of an authority specified in a particular way has to be justified by reasoning or at least a show of reasoning. If reasoning flows from and terminates in an authority without flowing beyond it and around it, so to speak, the fact that that ‘authority’ is not accepted by the other party is sufficient to bring the dialogue to an immediate end, leaving room only for a futile talking at cross purposes.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1972

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References

page 292 note 1 ‘Ignorance’ (Avidya) and ‘Sin’ would consequently be two ways of accounting for the present ‘unregenerate’ state of man.

page 294 note 1 Differences in views about the nature of the Ultimate are accompanied by corresponding differences in our ways of conceiving the relation of the soul to God. On Sankara's view the Self is identical with Brahman which transcends relations. On any other view that is not strictly non-dualistic the distinction between the soul and God is regarded as ultimate, however close the mode of union between the two. In the former view individuality is transcended; in the latter set of views individuality is affirmed as real and eternal. A reconciliation of the two views about the nature of God cannot be complete unless there is a corresponding reconciliation of the view that the self ultimately merges in God and the view that affirms that the distinction between the two is ultimate.

page 297 note 1 SriAurobindo, , The Life Divine (Calcutta Arya Publishing House), Vol. II, pp. 46–7.Google Scholar

page 300 note 1 SriAurobindo, , The Life Divine (Calcutta Arya Publishing House), Vol. II, p. 232.Google Scholar

page 301 note 1 It is called ‘the pathless path’ and the Buddha is referred to as ‘the Pathless One’.

page 305 note 1 SriAurobindo, , The Life Divine (Calcutta Arya Publishing House), Vol. II, pp. 103–4.Google Scholar