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Peerhood in deep religious disagreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 October 2015

STEFAN REINING
STEFAN REINING*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen, 45117 Essen, Germany e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

My aim in this article is to widen the scope of the current debate on peer disagreement by applying it to a kind of case it has hitherto remained silent about – namely, to cases of disagreement in which one of the disagreeing parties bases her opinion on a private religious experience to which the other party has no access. In order to do this, I will introduce a modified version of the notion of peerhood – a version that, in contrast to the one employed in the current debate, can be fruitfully applied to the troublesome kind of case in question. I will then employ this new notion in order to specify the degree of conciliation rationally required from the disagreeing parties in the kind of case in question.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 52 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 403 - 419
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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