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On the concept of a spirit

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2016

ANDREW M. BAILEY
ANDREW M. BAILEY*
Affiliation:
Division of Humanities (Philosophy), Yale-NUS College, 10 College Ave West, #02-06D, Singapore138609
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Substance dualism is on the move. Though the view remains unfashionable, a growing and diverse group of philosophers endorse it on impressive empirical, religious, and purely metaphysical grounds. In this note, I develop and evaluate one conceptual argument for substance dualism. According to that argument, we may derive a conclusion about our nature from the mere fact that we have the concept of a spirit. The argument is intriguing and fruitful; but I shall contend that it is, nonetheless, unsound.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 53 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 449 - 457
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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