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On the Alleged Inseparability of Morality and Religion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

E. D. Klemke
E. D. Klemke
Affiliation:
Professor of Philosophy, Iowa State University
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Extract

In his Morality and Religion, W. W. Bartley III states that ‘the chief aim of this study is to get clearer about the extent to which morality and religion may be interdependent’ (p. i). After stating various possible alternatives, in terms of the logical relationships of derivability and compatibility, which are relevant to this issue, Prof. Bartley in fact devotes his book to a consid eration of four views:

(1) Morality is reducible to religion.

(2) Religion is reducible to morality.

(3) Morality and religion are in conflict (partly, not wholly).

(4) Morality and religion are inseparable.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 1975 , pp. 37 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1975

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References

Page 37 note 1 Bartley, W. W. III, Morality and Religion. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. and New York: St Martin's Press, 1971.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Page 37 note 2 Ibid. All page references in parentheses refer to this volume.

Page 38 note 1 Prof. Bartley finds a similar distinction in the works of Mill also.

Page 38 note 2 This is his own expression, p. 55.

Page 40 note 1 I shall not elaborate upon those points with which I agree.

Page 42 note 1 I am not here merely questioning inferences from is to ought (which Prof. Bartley discusses in his book).

Page 43 note 1 I have discussed this issue at length in ‘Are Philosophical Questions Linguistic?’, The Personalist, Vol. 50, No. 4 (1969), pp. 490–507.Google Scholar

Page 43 note 2 I say ‘similar’ because, of course, the referent in the latter case is an empirically discernible single object.

Page 47 note 1 Mill, J. S., An Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 122.Google Scholar

Page 48 note 1 Mill, J. S., An Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 122.Google Scholar

Page 48 note 2 Popper, Karl R., Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), P. 33.Google Scholar