Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T02:21:29.104Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A new free-will defence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 May 2003

ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 20057-1133
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper argues that if creatures are to have significant free will, then God's essential omni-benevolence and essential omnipotence cannot logically preclude Him from creating a world containing a moral evil. The paper maintains that this traditional conclusion does not need to rest on reliance on subjunctive conditionals of free will. It can be grounded in several independent ways based on premises that many will accept.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , June 2003 , pp. 211 - 223
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)