^{page 116 note 1} For a contemporary statement see Holland, R. F., ‘The Miraculous’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1965, PP. 43–51 (esp. P. 43 f).Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 2} There are obvious affinities with existentialist theologies which continue to speak of God and God's action while denying any real ontological commitment to such a being or his acts. Cf Flew, A., God and Philosophy (London, 1966), p. 144.Google Scholar

^{page 117 note 1} Cf. also Augustine, , ‘Works’, vol. 5 (E.T. ed by Marcus Dods) (Edinburgh, 1871–6), pp. 508–9;Google ScholarAquinas, , Summa Theologica, vol. 14 (E.T. ed by Gilby, Thomas) (London, 1964-unfinished), Part 1, Question 105, Articles 6–8.Google Scholar

^{page 117 note 2} So McKinnon, A., ‘“Miracle” and “Paradox”’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1967, pp. 308–314 (esp. p. 310).Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 1} Or, better, to suspend its effects.

^{page 118 note 2} e.g. ‘Miracles’, Article in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5 (ed.) Edwards, P. (New York, 1967), PP. 346–53.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 3} Hume's similar criticism is to be found in Enquiries (ed.) Selby-Bigge, L. (Oxford, 1962 ²), Section 10 entitled ‘Of Miracles’, pp. 109–31 (esp. pp. 114 ff.).Google Scholar Cp. also McKinnon, , op. cit., p. 309 f.Google Scholar

^{page 118 note 4} See Flew, art. cit., p. 349. Holland, , op. cit., p. 45.Google ScholarBroad, C. D., Hume's Theory of the Credibility of Miracles (P.A.S., 1916–17)Google Scholar reprinted in Sesonke, A. and Fleming, N. (eds.) Human Understanding (Belmont, California, 1965), pp. 86–98 (esp. p. 92 f.).Google Scholar

^{page 119 note 1} op. cit., pp. 116 ff.

^{page 119 note 2} op. cit., pp. 149 ff. Hume’s Philosophy of Belief (London, 1966 ²), pp. 235 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 120 note 1} Apart from Flew the same sort of distinction has been pointed out by Hesse, M., ‘Miracles and the Laws of Nature’ in Moule, C. F. D. (ed.) Miracles (London, 1965), pp. 35–42Google Scholar, and by Smart, N.Philosophers and Religious Truth (London, 1964 ¹), pp. 26–56.Google Scholar In intention, of course, the violation model aimed to circumvent the necessity for this distinction because it was thought a violation must authenticate God's act.

^{page 120 note 2} Eichrodt, W., Theology of the Old Testament (E.T. London, 1961, 7), vol. 2, pp. 162–7 (et al.), contains an instructive discussion of the Hebrew view.Google Scholar Flew, art. cit. p. 347, notices this but then proceeds to ignore it!

^{page 121 note 1} ‘Causes and Conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1965, pp. 245–64.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 2} ‘Causal Relations’, Journal of Philosophy, 1967, pp. 691–703.Google Scholar

^{page 121 note 3} I think that it is not unimportant to remain independent of such commitments when discussing miracles if at all possible.

^{page 121 note 4} To reiterate I think these formulations are (or could be made) acceptable to all parties to the dispute about causation.

^{page 122 note 1} Whether they formulated it in this way is, of course, irrelevant to whether it is ontologically satisfactory.

^{page 122 note 2} Langtry, B. N., of the University of Sydney, has pointed out a similar proposal in C. S. Lewis, Miracles (London, 1964 ⁴), pp. 59–66.Google Scholar As I mentioned previously N. Smart, op cit., endorses something Like it, too.

^{page 122 note 3} Flew, Hum's Philosophy of Belief, points out a Humean strategy in connection with this matter in chapter seven of that work.

^{page 123 note 1} Miracles do not endorse or prove a revelation so much as constitute a part of it.

^{page 123 note 2} I will not take time out to discuss Hume's important particular objections. Though they command respect some of them at least are set aside I think by the view of miracle I defended. For on Hume's view only the allegedly physically impossible could be miraculous—his ontological argument (‘the decisive argument’) cannot be completely cut adrift from his epistemological objections. On this see Flew, art. cit., pp. 350–2.

It may be worthwhile to discuss briefly one of his epistemological arguments, though, because of its current relevance. He argues roughly that if not all religions are true and if all religions produce miracles, most miracles must be deceptions. All religions do produce miracles, therefore there is always a high probability of deception.

What he leaves out is the possibility that the one God may produce all the real miracles regardless of which ‘religious tradition’ acknowledges them and regardless of whether a particular tradition adequately recognises their author.

^{page 124 note 1} Such a conception of resurrection would be the only sort countenanced by Hebrews. Clearly, if it occurred, it constitutes a miracle on my view, for we know enough of what happens to the dead shortly after death to say that ceteris paribus bodily resurrection is altogether improbable—but if God raised Jesus a new factor was involved in the incident and the probabilities change.

^{page 125 note 1} For an elaborate and instructive illustration of my point see Donagan, A., ‘Alternative Historical Explanations and Their Verification’, The Monist, 1969, pp. 58–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Donagan does not, of course, put the matter as I have. Equally interesting is that even ‘covering law theorists’ are inclined to note nowadays that the explanandum may not be deducible from the explanans and that only probability may be inferred.

^{page 125 note 2} Cp. Hick, J., Faith and Knowledge (London, 1967 ²)Google Scholar; Plantinga, A., God and Other Minds (Ithaca, N.Y., 1967)Google Scholar; Penelhum, T., ‘Is a Religious Epistemology Possible’ in Vey, G. (ed.); Knowledge and Necessity (London, 1970), pp. 263–80 among others.CrossRefGoogle Scholar