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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Leibniz contrasted his views of necessity, possibility, and impossibility with those of Descartes and Spinoza. On the one hand, he argued that Descartes erred by allowing that God has the ability to make contradictory claims true. On the other hand, Leibniz found Spinoza's commitment to fatalism to be counterintuitive. I show that, given his in-esse account of truth, Leibniz could not have avoided a commitment to fatalism, without affirming one of the most objectionable features of Descartes' divine voluntarism, the contingency of the law of noncontradiction.
1 As Stuart Brown notes, it is generally agreed that Leibniz's mature philosophy began with the Discourse on Metaphysics [Leibniz (Sussex: the Harvester Press Limited, 1984) page 95].Google Scholar
2 For an excellent survey of Leibniz's various attempts see Robert Adams' ‘Leibniz's Theories of Contingency’ in Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays ed. Hooker, Michael (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) pages 243–283.Google Scholar
3 In this assay I employ the following abbreviations: AT: Descartes, Rene Oeuvres de Descartes publiees par C. Adam and P. Tannerty. Nouvelle presentation (12 vols., Paris: Vrin, 1964–76); A and G: Leibniz, G. W., Philosophical Essays edited and translated by Roger, Ariew and Daniel, Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989)Google Scholar; C: Leibniz, G. W. Opuscles et Fragments inedits de Leibniz edited by Couturat, L. (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1903)Google Scholar; CSM-K: Descartes, , Rene, , The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume III The Correspondence translated by Cottingham, John, Stoothoff, Robert, Murdoch, Dugald, and Kenny, Anthony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; F de C: Leibniz, G. W., Nouvelles lettres et opuscules edited by de Careil, Louis Alexandre Foucher (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971)Google Scholar; G: Leibniz, G. W., Philosphische Schriften edited by Gerhardt, C. I., 7 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 875–1890)Google Scholar; Gr: Leibniz, G. W., Textes inedits edited by Gaston, Grua, 2 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948)Google Scholar; L: Leibniz, G. W., Philosophical Papers and Letters edited and translated by Loemker, Leroy E. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; M: Leibniz, G. W., Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology introduced by Paul, Janet and translated by Montgomery, George R. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962)Google Scholar; P A: Leibniz, G. W., Samtliche Schriften und Briefe edited by the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, after 1945 the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt and Leipzig: Akademie-Verlag, 1923–)Google Scholar; T: Leibniz, G. W., Theodicy edited and introduced by Austin, Farrer, and translated by Huggard, E. M. (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1985).Google Scholar
4 See Augustine's Eighty-three Different Questions 46, 2.
5 The ‘dangerous proposition’ is found in Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, Part III, Article 47.
6 See, for example, section six of the Discourse on Metaphysics, where Leibniz claimed that God ‘…has chosen the most perfect world’ (G IV 431/A and G 39).
7 See section 13 of the Discourse on Metaphysics (G IV 436–439/A and G 44–46) as well as Leibniz's ‘Remarks upon Mr. Arnauld's letter’, May 1686 (G II 37–47/M 103–119), and Leibniz's July 14, 1686 letter to Arnauld (G II 47–59/M 119–136).
8 1676 was the year in which Leibniz wrote ‘Two Notations for Discussion with Spinoza’ (G VII 261–262/L 167–168). In that essay Leibniz stated, ‘…all propositions which are necessarily true are either demonstrable or known per se’ (G VII 261/L 167).
9 The translation is by Catherine Wilson and is quoted from her work, Leibniz's Metaphysics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) page 39.Google Scholar
10 Benson Mates illustrates the Euclidean procedure. See his work, The Philosophy of Leibniz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) pages 109–111.Google Scholar
11 See pages 504–505 of Professor Blumenfeld's ‘Leibniz on Contingency and Infinite Analysis’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. XLV, No. 4, June 1985, pages 483–514.Google Scholar
12 So far as I know, very little has been written about this feature of Leibniz's analytic account of contingency. Aside from my doctoral dissertation, the only explicit mention of it that I am aware of is E. M. Curley's brief remarks regarding G. H. R. Parkinson's exposition of Leibniz's account of God's creation of the best possible world. Professor Parkinson's exposition is found on pages 108–110 of his Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965)Google Scholar. For Professor Curley's remarks see page 242 of his ‘Recent Work of 17th Century Continental Philosophy,’ American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 11, No. 4, October 1974, pages 235–255.Google Scholar
13 My account of possible worlds as maximal and complete novels is influenced by the work of Alvin Plantinga. See The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974) pages 44–46.Google Scholar
14 This paper began as a chapter in my doctoral dissertation, Necessity, Contingency, and Certainty: the Cartesian Consequences of Leibniz's Modal Views. I wish to thank Keith Yandell, Steven Nadler, Paula Gottlieb, Patrick Riley, and Michael Byrd for serving on my dissertation committee. As always, I am especially grateful to Mark Linville and Keith Yandell for their criticism and encouragement.