¹ See Adams's, Robert splendid essay, ‘Leibniz's Theories of Contingency’, in Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Hooker, M. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 243–83.Google Scholar

² In this essay I employ the following abbreviations: A and G: Leibniz, G. W., Philosophical Essays, ed. and tr. by Ariew, R. & Garber, D. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989)Google Scholar; C: Leibniz, G. W. Opuscles et Fragments inedits de Leibniz, ed. Couturat, L. (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1903)Google Scholar. F de C: Leibniz, G. W., Nouvelles lettres et opuscules, ed. Careil, L. A. Foucher de (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971)Google Scholar; G: Leibniz, G. W., Philosphische Schriften, ed. Gerhardt, C. I., 7 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–1890)Google Scholar; Gr: Leibniz, G. W., Textes inedits, ed. Grua, G., 2 vols (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948);Google Scholar L: Leibniz, G. W., Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and tr. Loemker, L. E. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976);CrossRefGoogle Scholar M: Leibniz, G. W., Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology, intr. P. Janet and tr. Montgomery, G. R. (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962);Google Scholar P: Leibniz, G. W., De Summa Rerum Metaphysical Papers, 1675–1676, tr. Parkinson, G. H. R. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992);Google Scholar PA: Leibniz, G. W., Samtliche Schriften und Briefe ed. the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, after 1945 the Deutsche Akadamie de Wissenschaften (Darmstadt and Leipzig: Akademie-Verlag, 1923–)Google Scholar R: Leibniz, G. W., G. W. Leibniz's Monadology, An Edition for Students, Rescher, N. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992).Google Scholar

³ In Section XIII of the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz tried to preserve contingency by appealing to God's ‘first free decree’ (G IV 438/A and G 46). In his correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz made much of the distinction between substances conceived sub ratione generalatis and sub ratione possibilitatis (GII 52/M 125–6). For a helpful account of this distinction see Stuart Brown's comments in Leibniz (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1984), pp. 125–9.Google Scholar

⁴ The translation is by Catherine Wilson and is found in her work, Leibniz's Metaphysics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 39.Google Scholar

⁵ ‘Indeed, there is…no substance so imperfect that it does not contain the entire universe, and whatever it is, was, or will be, in its complete notion (as it exists in the divine mind), nor is there any truth of fact or any truth concerning individual things that does not depend upon the series of infinite reasons’ (F de C 180–1/A and G 95).

⁶ David Blumenfeld makes this point in ‘Leibniz on Contingency and Infinite Analysis’, ‘The doctrine of infinite analysis thus implies that the question whether a certain world is best is one whose answer varies from world to world’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XLV (1985), 510.Google Scholar

⁷ It is well known that Leibniz endorsed a version of the ontological argument (cf. e.g. G VII 261–2/L 167–8; G IV 290–6/A and G 235–40). There is, however, disagreement over the status of Leibniz's modal argument for God's existence (G IV 405–6). Nicholas Rescher maintains that the modal argument should not be understood as an a priori argument. See Professor Rescher's Leibniz An Introduction to his Philosophy (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979), pp. 148–50.Google Scholar David Blumenfeld disagrees. See his ‘Leibniz's Proof of the Possibility of God’, Studia Leibnitiana, IV (1972), 132–40.Google Scholar

⁸ In another text Leibniz referred to this proposition as ‘the pinnacle of modal theory…’ (PA IV 3, 84/P 107).