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Is the no-minimum claim true? Reply to Cullison

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2011

JEFF JORDAN
JEFF JORDAN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716-29901
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Is the no-minimum claim true? I have argued that it is not. Andrew Cullison contends that my argument fails, since human sentience is variable; while Michael Schrynemakers has contended that the failure is my neglect of vagueness. Both, I argue, are wrong.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 125 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

Notes

1. Peter van Inwagen The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 106.

2. Jordan, Jeff‘Evil and van Inwagen’, Faith and Philosophy, 20 (2003), 236–239CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. Perhaps one might claim that it is best to take van Inwagen's argument as involving cases or instances of evil (pain and suffering), rather than the intensity of pain and suffering within a case. This distinction is irrelevant, since even if the argument was intended as involving the former, the latter would still be of philosophical interest.

4. Cullison, Andrew‘A defence of the no-minimum response to the problem of evil’, Religious Studies, 47 (2011), 121–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. Assuming that pleasure alone would not suffice as an incitement for action.

6. Schrynemakers, Michael‘Vagueness and pointless evil’, American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the ACPA, 80 (2007), 245–254CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. With everything else (distribution of the suffering for instance) equal.