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Is faith in the Ultimate rationally required? Taking issue with some arguments in The Will to Imagine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2013

WES MORRISTON
WES MORRISTON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Hellems 167, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 49 , Special Issue 2: Critical Essays on J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion , June 2013 , pp. 209 - 220
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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References

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