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Hume'S Critique of Miracles: An Irrelevant Triumph1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Richard L. Fern
Richard L. Fern
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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Extract

In The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Hume argues that there can in principle be no good reason for believing a miracle has occurred. Recently, Richard Swinburne has disagreed, arguing that there could be good reason to believe a miracle has occurred. I will argue that both Hume and Swinburne are correct. So long as we accept Hume's notion of a miracle, his argument against the rationality of belief in such events stands firm. In this respect, Swinburne's attempted refutation fails. In a deeper sense, however, Swinburne's project succeeds. Hume's critique of miracles turns on a truncated understanding of the supernatural. Making use of suggestions drawn from Swinburne's unsuccessful argument, the concept of miracle can be reformulated so as to allow for the possibility of rational belief.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 18 , Issue 3 , September 1982 , pp. 337 - 354
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1982

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References

page 337 note 2 Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section XGoogle Scholar, ‘Of Miracles’; this is reprinted in David Hume on Human Nature and the Understanding, ed. Flew, Antony (Collier Books, 1962).Google Scholar In the first part of Section X, Hume develops the argument with which we will be concerned here. In the second part, Hume goes on to argue, somewhat curiously in light of the first part, that what evidence there is that miracles occur is bad evidence.

page 337 note 3 Swinburne, Richard, The Concept of Miracle (London: MacMillan, 1970).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 337 note 4 Hume, , p. 119.Google Scholar

page 337 note 5 Hume, , p. 119f.Google Scholar

page 337 note 6 Hume, , p. 119.Google Scholar

page 338 note 1 Hume, , p. 119.Google Scholar

page 338 note 2 Hume, , p. 120.Google Scholar

page 338 note 3 Ernst, and Keller, Marie-Luise, Miracles in Dispute (Fortress, 1969), pp. 161 f.Google Scholar

page 339 note 1 Hume, , p. 116.Google Scholar

page 340 note 1 Hume, , p. 120.Google Scholar At this point Hume offers an example which is somewhat misleading: ‘When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened’. Here, Hume anticipates his argument in the second part of Section X. A clearer statement of Hume's more general conclusions regarding the possibility of good evidence is given at the conclusion of Section X.

page 340 note 2 Hume, , p. 132f.Google Scholar

page 341 note 1 Swinburne, , p. 34.Google Scholar

page 342 note 1 Swinburne, , p. 35.Google Scholar

page 342 note 2 Swinburne, , p. 35.Google Scholar

page 342 note 3 Swinburne, , p. 36.Google Scholar

page 343 note 1 Hume, , p. 118f.Google Scholar

page 343 note 2 Hume, , p. 133.Google Scholar

page 343 note 3 Hume, , p. 134.Google Scholar

page 344 note 1 Diamond, Malcolm, Contemporary Philosophy and Religious Thought (McGraw-Hill, 1994).Google Scholar Diamond's argument here is similar to that in ‘Miracles’, Religious Studies, IX, 307–324.Google Scholar

page 344 note 2 Diamond, , op. cit. p. 64.Google Scholar

page 345 note 1 Swinburne, , p. 27.Google Scholar I assume that when Swinburne says the circumstances can be ‘as similar as we like in any respect’, he is implicity omitting all supernatural factors. Otherwise, he is committed to the claim that miracles are irregular events, a claim which later chapters indicate he would reject.

page 346 note 1 Swinburne, , p. 32.Google Scholar

page 347 note 1 Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 65.Google Scholar

page 349 note 1 Lewis, C. S., Miracles: A Preliminary Study (MacMillan, 1947), pp. 60f.Google Scholar

page 350 note 1 Nowell-Smith, , ‘Miracles - The Philosophical Approach: A Reply to Mr. Arnold Lunn’, The Hibbert journal, XLVIII (July, 1950)Google Scholar; reprinted in Phiolosophy of Religion, ed. Rowe, W. L. and Wainwright, W. J. (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973), 397.Google Scholar

page 350 note 2 Swinburne, Richard G.., ‘Miracles’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 18, no. 73, 10, 1968Google Scholar; reprinted in Rowe, and Wainwright, , 409.Google Scholar

page 352 note 1 Lewis, , pp. 98–102Google Scholar (chapter 12, ‘The Propriety of Miracles’).

page 352 note 2 Herdon, J. A., ‘The Concept of Miracle from St Augustine to Modern Apologetics’, Theological Studies, XV, 1954, 252.Google Scholar

page 352 note 3 Heimheck, Raeburne, Theology and Meaning (Stanford, 1969), p. 222.Google Scholar

page 353 note 1 Hume, , p. 133.Google Scholar

page 353 note 2 Locke, John, ‘A Discourse of Miracles’, reprinted in The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. Ramsey, I. T. (Adam & Charles Block, 1958), p. 85.Google Scholar

page 353 note 3 Locke, , p. 86.Google Scholar

page 354 note 1 Swinburne, , Miracle, pp. 65fGoogle Scholar; ‘Miracles’, p. 408.Google Scholar

page 354 note 2 Lampe, G. W. H., ‘Miracles and Early Christian Apologetic’, Miracles, ed. Moule, C. F. D.Mowbray, A. R., 1965), p. 214.Google Scholar

page 354 note 3 In addition to dealing with various ‘factual objections’ the evidence is simply not there a defence of the rationality of belief in miracles would have to tackle various ‘religious objections’. Numerous theologians, including Schleiermacher, Tillich and Bultmann, have argued that belief in miracles (gua supernatural interventions) is incompatible with true (genuine) religious belief and practice. Cf. Schleiermacher, Friedrich, The Christian Faith, ed. MacKintosh, H. R. and Stewart, J. S. (T and T Clark, 1928), pp. 178184Google Scholar; Tillich, Paul, Systematic Theology, 1, (Chicago, 1967), 11518Google Scholar; RudolfBultmann, , ‘New Testament and Mythology’, reprinted in Kerygma and Myth, ed. Bartsch, Hans W.. (Harper & Row, 1961). pp. 144.Google Scholar For a counter argument see Lewis' discussion in Miracles. For a discussion of the sorts of reasons one might give for or against a religious belief, see my paper ‘Religious Inquiry’ (forthcoming).