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God, Probability and John Hick
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
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Whether or not any notion of probability is meaningful in the philosophy of religion has been the subject of considerable discussion. Ranging from our common sense usage in which probability implies ‘possibly’ but not ‘certainly’ to its highly sophisticated usage in pure mathematics, the question of its philosophical foundations is one of the most controversial in logical theory. Some thinkers argue that statistical frequency is the only legitimate notion of probability, and, inasmuch as such frequency is tied to discrete observable phenomena, probability judgments have little, if any, application to religious explanations of the entire universe. Foremost, perhaps, among philosophers of religion in Anglo-American thought who support this concept is John Hick. In this article, I shall delineate Hick's attitude towards probability and evidence and how it relates to his concept of faith. Then I shall raise some critical questions about his analysis and try to show that his view is unnecessarily restrictive – even inconsistent – in places. To look at Hick and probability in focus, however, we must look through the lens of his general approach to epistemological issues.
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References
page 457 note 1 See especially The Existence of God, edited by Hick, (New York: Macmillan, 1964Google Scholar), chapter 1. Hereafter cited as EG.
page 457 note 2 Hick, John, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 200–1Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as FK. 3FK, p. 203.Google Scholar
page 458 note 1 FK, p. 205.Google Scholar
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page 458 note 4 Found in FK, pp. 113–14.Google Scholar
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page 460 note 1 Black, Max, ‘Probability’, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards, Paul, VI, 464Google Scholar. See also Probability and Evidence, by Ayer, A. J. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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page 460 note 3 Black, p. 464.Google Scholar
page 460 note 4 Black, p. 476.Google Scholar
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