Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 February 2009
Paul Sheehy has argued that the modal realist cannot satisfactorily allow for the necessity of God's existence. In this short paper I show that she can, and that Sheehy only sees a problem because he has failed to appreciate all the resources available to the modal realist. God may be an abstract existent outside spacetime or He may not be: but either way, there is no problem for the modal realist to admit that He exists at every concrete possible world.
1. Sheehy, Paul ‘Theism and modal realism’, Religious Studies, 42 (2006), 315–328CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2. The canonical presentation and defence of modal realism is in David Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
3. Sheehy ‘Theism and modal realism’, 319.
4. David Lewis ‘Postscripts to “Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic”’, 39–40, in his Philosophical Papers volume 1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 39–46.
5. Ibid., 40.
6. Sheehy ‘Theism and modal realism’, 319.
7. David Lewis ‘New work for a theory of universals’, 11, n. 5, in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 8–55.