^{page 463 note 1} Such a physical blow may produce a ‘reflex action’: such a designation is misleading for our discussion.

^{page 463 note 2} This basic fact is well attested throughout the literature, and a corroborative note would be a bibliography.

^{page 464 note 1} Davidson, Donald, ‘Agency’, in Agent, Action and Reason ed. Binley, et al. (Toronto, 1971), p. 81.Google Scholar

^{page 464 note 2} Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind (London, 1949), p. 15.Google Scholar

^{page 464 note 3} Ibid. pp. 32, 135–49; cf. Kenny, Anthony, Action, Emotion and Will, (2nd ednLondon, 1979), p. 137.Google Scholar

^{page 464 note 4} Hampshire, Stuart, Thought and Action (London, 1959), p. 177.Google Scholar Cp. MacMurray, John, The Self as Agent (London, 1967), pp. 15f., 184.Google Scholar

^{page 464 note 5} Ryle does not give a detailed analysis of intention, but he does offer one for ‘motive’, a near relation: PP. 93, 111f.

^{page 464 note 6} In his preface to Ryle's posthumous On Thinking (Oxford, 1979), G.J. Warnock discusses this possible interpretation of Ryle, but is not clear about its validity.

^{page 464 note 7} Hornsby, Jennifer, Actions (London, 1980), p. 13.Google Scholar

^{page 464 note 8} Ibid. ch. 1, esp. pp. 1, 5, 11, 14, 28.

^{page 465 note 1} Intention (Oxford, 1957), pp. 11–28.

^{page 465 note 2} Ibid. p. 9

^{page 465 note 3} Ibid. pp. 28–30. Examples could be used which purport to show that sometimes intentions never seem to get beyond our minds – even though they sometimes ‘shape’ other actions.

^{page 465 note 4} We might argue that motives limit actions, and thus function as material causes. Motives limit actions by defining the limits of an agent's interest and involvement.

^{page 465 note 5} At this juncture I see no need to ask whether mental and psychological causes must be distinguished from each other. We allow Anscombe's label to stand.

^{page 466 note 1} Anscombe, , pp. 21ff.Google Scholar

^{page 466 note 2} Ibid. p. 21.

^{page 466 note 3} Kenny, , p. 86;Google Scholar cp. pp. 84, 92, 144. Cp. also Anscombe, , pp.86, 34f.Google Scholar

^{page 466 note 4} Kenny, , p. 77.Google Scholar

^{page 466 note 5} Anscombe, , pp. 24f, 49–57;Google ScholarDavidson, , pp. 93f;Google ScholarHampshire, , pp. 48, 54, 102f, 95f;Google ScholarMacMurray, , pp. 152, 195–7;Google ScholarHornsby, , p. 37.Google Scholar

^{page 466 note 6} Even this innocuous example is open to some objection: is doodling still doodling if the doodler is Picasso?

^{page 467 note 1} So far as I know, this ‘Law’ has not been invoked directly in theodicy.

^{page 467 note 2} Hornsby, , p. 33.Google Scholar

^{page 467 note 3} Ibid. p. 34, where the question of unactualized intention is tackled.

^{page 467 note 4} Hampshire, , pp. 170f, 182f, 192f.Google Scholar Of course, to try to act in some way is sometimes actually to act in another: Hornsby, , pp. 38–44.Google Scholar

^{page 467 note 5} Farrer, Austin, The Freedom of the Will (London, 1958), p. 257.Google Scholar Cp. Anscombe, pp. 91–3.Google Scholar

^{page 468 note 1} The law, of course, says that ignorance is no defence.

^{page 469 note 1} In White, A. R., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford, 1968), p. 120.Google Scholar

^{page 469 note 2} While intention is not causally prior, yet the intention to murder precedes the completed act. There clearly come a ‘point of no return’ in our actions. Intending properly begins to change my acting immediately I start intending it, so that in some sense it is being actualized as soon as it is intended. Knox, , Action (London, 1968), p. 97:Google Scholar ‘The decision to act is the beginning of the action, not the last step before the action starts’.

^{page 471 note 1} Danto, Arthur C., ‘Basic Actions’, in White, op. cit. pp. 45, 51.Google Scholar

^{page 471 note 2} Hornsby, , pp. 66f.Google Scholar

^{page 472 note 1} Oedipus may have enjoyed making love to Jocasta, but not to his mother. The example is Kenny's, , pp. 130ff.Google Scholar

^{page 473 note 1} ‘Freedom and Grace’ in his Freedom and Grace (London, 1976), pp. 6f.

^{page 474 note 1} We borrow this definition of responsibility from Joel Feinberg (‘ Action and Responsibility’ in White, , op. cit. p. 109)Google Scholar, thinking it convenient rather than exhaustive.

^{page 474 note 2} Hampshire, , p. 72 and also p. 133;Google ScholarFarrer, , p. 289;Google ScholarMacMurray, , pp. 166–9.Google Scholar

^{page 475 note 1} Cf Ramsey, Ian T., Models for Divine Activity (London, 1973), ch. 2.Google Scholar

^{page 475 note 2} Kenny, , p. 86.Google Scholar

^{page 475 note 3} Hampshire, , p. 121.Google Scholar

^{page 476 note 1} Donovan, Peter, A Philosophical Analysis of the Doctrine of Providence, with reference to the theology of H. H. Farmer, Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1971, p. 208;Google Scholar cp. Brown, D. G., Action (Toronto, 1968), pp. 3–6.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

^{page 477 note 1} Process theologians have been in the forefront of late in these developments. W. D. Hudson's work is also notable, as is Grace Jantzen's recent fine study God's World, God's Body (London, 1984).

^{page 477 note 2} Process theologians offer such a ‘locus’ in God's consequent or concrete nature.

^{page 477 note 3} The work of Schubert Ogden, Gordon Kaufman and Maurice Wiles is in my mind.

^{page 477 note 4} Farrer, Austin, Faith and Speculation (London, 1967), p. 66.Google Scholar

^{page 477 note 5} Donovan, , pp. 214f.Google Scholar

^{page 478 note 1} Ibid. pp. 219f.

^{page 478 note 2} Unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford 1984, ‘Can God act in History? A Whiteheadian Perspective.’Google Scholar

^{page 478 note 3} Farrer, , Freedom of the Will chs IX and XV.Google Scholar

^{page 479 note 1} The Meaning of God (London, 1968), p. 62.

^{page 480 note 1} Hampshire, , p. 170.Google Scholar

^{page 480 note 2} Barbour, Ian C., Myths, Models and Paradigms (London, 1974), p. 161.Google Scholar

^{page 480 note 3} MacMurray, , p. 145.Google Scholar

^{page 480 note 4} King, , pp. 90ff.Google Scholar

^{page 481 note 1} E.g. the question of temporality – see Swinburne, R. G., The Existence of God (Oxford, 1979), pp. 93ff.Google Scholar