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Games of cricket and the General Resurrection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2015

RICHARD STURCH*
Affiliation:
35 Broomfield, Stacey Bushes, Milton Keynes, MK12 6HA, UK e-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

It is often objected to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the dead that if we reject dualism and disembodied existence there is no way even for God to bring it about that a resurrected person is identical with his or her supposed original, rather than just a duplicate. My response is that if God intended all along that people should have two periods of existence, the problem vanishes. In a Test Match, there are long periods when the ground and stands are empty and no play takes place, yet no-one says that the resumed game may only be a duplicate of that of the previous day. The same holds for a resurrection intended from the beginning.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

Simak, C (1984) The Goblin Reservation (London: Rapp & Whiting).Google Scholar
van Inwagen, Peter (1978) ‘The possibility of resurrection’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 9, 114121.Google Scholar
Zimmerman, Dean (2010) ‘Bodily resurrection: the falling elevator model revisited’, in Gasser, G. (ed.) Personal Identity and Resurrection (Farnham & Burlington: Ashgate), 3350.Google Scholar