^1. Andrei, A. Buckareff and Allen, Plug ‘Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell’, Religious Studies, 41 (2005), 39–54Google Scholar.

^2. Linda, Zagzebski ‘Religious luck’, Faith and Philosophy, 11 (1994), 397–413Google Scholar.

^3. See, e.g. Joel Feinberg ‘Problematic responsibility in law and morals’, Philosophical Review, 71 (1962), 340–351; B. A. O. Williams ‘Moral luck’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol. 50 (1976), 115–135; T. Nagel ‘Moral luck’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol. 50 (1976), 137–151.

^4. Zagzebski ‘Religious luck’, 402–403.

^5. By ‘the problem of religious luck’ I mean to refer to the special problem of luck that arises for Christian moral theory and soteriology. This special problem of luck is the problem at issue throughout this paper.

^6. Zagzebski ‘Religious luck’, particularly 407. In her paper, Zagzebski argues that religious luck seems like a problem to us for the same reason moral luck seems like a problem, namely, that it is unfair. She has recently suggested to me in correspondence that religious luck seems like a problem for another reason as well: It is contrary to our notion of a loving God. If God loves each person individually, we would not expect Him to treat some persons in ways that make it likely that they will spend eternity in hell.

^7. What follows can be found in more detail in Zagzebski ‘Religious luck’, 407–411.

^8. See Zagzebski's (Ibid., 399–401) discussion of Feinberg's (‘Problematic responsibility in law and morals’, passim) argument that moral responsibility is in principle undecidable.

^9. This is not to say that universalism has not had able defenders among Christians. Among contemporary philosophers who defend universalism, Marilyn McCord Adams stands out. See, e.g. her ‘The problem of hell: a problem of evil for Christians’, in Eleonore Stump (ed.) Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 301–327.

^10. This is an abbreviated and paraphrased version of the argument offered in Buckareff and Plug ‘Escaping hell’, esp. 42–45.

^11. For consideration of an objection that is related to the problem I raise here, see Ibid., 51–52. The objection Buckareff and Plug consider is that escapism ‘cheapens’ God's grace, because those who resist His grace during their lives can then receive it in the afterlife, and so avoid the undesirable consequences of rejecting grace. Buckareff and Plug respond by arguing: ‘On the contrary, the benefits to be procured in this life from being in loving communion with God should provide the impetus for the unrepentant to turn to God. They should not turn to God simply because they fear that He will subject them to torture for all time. But making the right choices this side of death and the resurrection may prepare us to be the kind of persons prepared to enter into everlasting communion with God. Waiting only postpones the process in question, making it more difficult for us to be fit for communion with God due to persistent recalcitrance and obduracy.’

^12. I do not mean to suggest by this discussion that there is a determinate probability that constitutes a person's ‘chances’ for salvation, but I do mean to suggest that it is harder or perhaps less likely for some than others.

^13. Nagel ‘Moral luck’, passim, distinguishes between luck in constitution, circumstances, and consequences. My discussion of escapism has focused on the problems of luck in constitution. It is not clear to me whether on Buckareff's and Plug's account there is also luck in circumstances or consequences, for they have not described the condition of those in hell in much detail. If the condition of the inhabitants of hell does allow for luck in circumstances or consequences, this further compounds the problem.

^14. Buckareff and Plug recognize C. S. Lewis's The Great Divorce (New York NY: Macmillan, 1946) as an inspiration for their theory. It is worth noting that this second account of the influence of the initial character of the denizen of hell is reflected in The Great Divorce, 9–10. The denizens of hell continually quarrel with one another and move further away from one another. At the same time, they are moving away from the bus stop which represents the route to the outskirts of heaven. As the protagonist learns from a fellow traveller, ‘[The people of hell have] been moving on and on. Getting further apart. [The earlier arrivals are] so far off by now that they could never think of coming to the bus stop at all. Astronomical distances. … – Would they get to the bus stop in time, if they ever set out? – Well, theoretically. But it'd be a distance of light-years. And they wouldn't want to by now: not those old chaps like Tamberlaine and Genghiz Khan, or Julius Caesar, or Henry the Fifth.’

^15. Notice that for one who will experience eternity in heaven, the same utility calculus would show that a life of fulfilment and satisfaction in this life yields the same utility on balance as a life of intense and prolonged suffering, because the eternal expected utility is mathematically the same in each case. Yet it seems clear that a life of satisfaction followed by eternal bliss is much to be preferred to a life of suffering followed by eternal bliss. All other things being equal, no one would choose the latter over the former for herself or her child.

^16. Of course, if luck is understood simply as any factor outside a person's control which has a good or bad effect on that person, then grace is just a special kind of luck. I use both terms here to distinguish the ordinary sorts of luck from the special (good) luck that God gives to aid a person in attaining salvation.

^17. Gabriel Fackre The Christian Story: A Narrative Interpretation of Basic Christian Doctrine, vol. 1, 3rd edn (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 220–221; idem. ‘Divine perseverance’, in John Sanders (ed.) What About Those Who Have Never Heard? (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 71–95.

^18. Jerry Walls Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 83–93; idem ‘Eternal hell and the Christian concept of God’, in Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (eds) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 268–277.

^19. My thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for calling the work of Fackre and Walls to my attention.

^20. Allen Plug has suggested to me that he has such an intuition. Perhaps one way to explain this intuition while maintaining that grace comes in degrees is to think that when God grants someone grace, He always gives him enough grace. It is this last clause which gives rise to the idea that one either gets grace or one does not, for on this account it is true that one either gets enough grace or none at all. Yet this account is still consistent with the claim that it is possible for God to grant grace in different degrees to different people.

^21. Bob Johnson has suggested to me one possible account, which makes no reference to grace, of how God could accomplish this task. On this account, God resurrects the dead, some of whom will go to heaven and some to hell. In the process of resurrecting a person, God eliminates any elements of luck in this person's character due to his natural constitution, his circumstances in life, or the consequences of his actions. This proposal may have its own problems, perhaps particularly regarding personal identity. However, it represents another way to accomplish the heart of my proposal without talking about grace.

^22. An earlier draft of this paper was presented to participants of the 2006 Society of Christian Philosophers Pacific Region Conference at the University of San Diego. I extend my thanks to all those who participated in the session, as well as to those who discussed the thesis of this paper with me at informal times. I would especially like to thank my commentator, Allen Plug, who took my discussion of his own work seriously. No doubt there remain points of disagreement between us, but I have benefited greatly both from his written comments and from conversations with him. Several of the objections I consider in the final two sections were first raised by him in his written comments or in conversation. My gratitude is also due to Bob Johnson and Linda Zagzebski for helpful discussions and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Finally, Peter Byrne and an anonymous referee for this journal have provided comments which have improved the quality of the paper.