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Engaging and developing Ada Agada's philosophy: moral responsibility, creation, and the problem of evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2023

Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues Open the ORCID record for Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues [Opens in a new window]
Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Hunan University, Yuelu Academy, Changsha, China
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In a recent article in Religious Studies, Ada Agada argues that the problem of evil is relevant not only to those who consider God to hold the Omni-properties but also to those who understand God as a limited deity. He rightly points out that the limited-God literature in the African philosophy of religion has neglected to address the problem of evil by too quickly dismissing it. Agada then argues that the reason why the problem of evil is philosophically relevant for the limited-God view is that He, as the creator, has sufficient powers to address evil and, thereby, moral responsibility regarding the evil in the world. In this reply, I uphold that although Agada is correct to affirm that the problem of evil is relevant for the limited-God view, he is mistaken to contend that the reason is that God is the creator. I contest this view and argue that Agada has not given enough reasons to believe that God has moral responsibility over evil in the world. However, I illuminate how Agada can develop this argument in the future.

Keywords

African philosophybad luckcreationmoral responsibilitythe problem of evil
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 60 , Issue 4 , December 2024 , pp. 598 - 607
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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