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E. J. Lowe on the modal ontological argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 March 2019

DAN-JOHAN EKLUND
DAN-JOHAN EKLUND*
Affiliation:
The Department of Systematic Theology, Faculty of Theology, P.O. Box 4, 00014 University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

E. J. Lowe has defended a modal ontological argument that draws upon Plantinga's version. Briefly, the argument is this: God is a necessary being; possibly, God exists; hence, God exists. In this article, I accept the validity of Lowe's modal ontological argument and focus on how he seeks to justify the argument's possibility claim in reference to his essence-based account of modal knowledge. I argue that here Lowe's defence fails. I have two complaints. I call them ‘the modified “perfect island” objection’ and ‘the conflicting possibilities objection’. Both of these refer to the concern that Lowe's modal epistemology is too permissive: it permits justification of possibility claims that question the acceptability of the underlying modal epistemology.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 611 - 622
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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