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Divorcing theism from infallibilism: a reply to Robert Oakes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2007

MARTIJN BLAAUW
MARTIJN BLAAUW
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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Abstract

Robert Oakes has argued that theism defeats the ‘doctrine of public-world fallibilism’. That is, Oakes has argued that theism supports infallibilism about public-world beliefs such as ‘There is an olive on the floor’, or ‘I have two hands’. Given the enormous discussion of radical scepticism in the recent epistemological literature, this argument is well worth investigating. In this short note, however, I argue that the argument Oakes presents is unconvincing. The truth of theism does not support public-world infallibilism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , September 2007 , pp. 349 - 354
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

Notes

1. Oakes, Robert ‘Theism and infallibilism: a marriage made in heaven?’, Religious Studies, 40 (2004), 193–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. For more on the question whether our religious beliefs can be instances of knowledge, see Martijn Blaauw ‘Contrastivism and religious scepticism’, unpublished manuscript.

3. I am grateful to Peter Baumann, Leigh Clayton, Gerry Hough, and Bob Plant for useful feedback on earlier versions of this paper.