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A Defence of the Free Will Defence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
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In this paper I shall discuss a certain theodicy, or line of argument in response to the problem of evil, viz, the so-called ‘free will defence’. What I propose to do is defend this theodicy against an objection that has been made to it in recent years.
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page 335 note 1 Here and in the rest of the paper I shall speak of ‘Adam’ rather than use the generic term ‘man’, for this will perhaps sharpen our focus a bit. This should not be interpreted as a commitment to any particular interpretation of Genesis 2 and 3, however.
page 336 note 1 Several philosophers have argued that no one can legitimately be held morally responsible for truly uncaused choices. See, for example, Broad, C. D., ‘Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism’, Berofsky, Bernard (ed.), Free Will and Determinism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 154–6Google Scholar; R. E. Hobart, ‘Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable Without It’, ibid., p. 70 f.
page 336 note 2 Mackie, J. L., ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, Pike, Nelson (ed.), God and Evil (Englewood Cliffs New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 56.Google Scholar
page 339 note 1 This is actually a MPP argument of the form
(1) If p is a logically possible state of affairs, an omnipotent God can create p;
(2) p is a logically possible state of affairs;
(3) Therefore, an omnipotent God can create p, where ‘p’ means the state of affairs that Adam always freely chooses the good.
page 343 note 1 Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica (New York: Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947), I, 25, 3 and 4.Google Scholar
page 343 note 2 Like all analogies, these will break down if pushed too far. If they serve to illustrate my point, that is all I ask of them.
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