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Anselm's Definition of Freedom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Stanley G. Kane
Stanley G. Kane
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Miami University (Oxford, Ohio)
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Extract

In the philosophical world Anselm is known almost exclusively for the work in his two earliest writings, the Monologion and Proslogion, which, of course, includes his celebrated ontological argument for the existence of God. It is unfortunate that the rest of his work is not more widely known, for he makes some important contributions to western thought in later treatises that are virtually unknown to present-day philosophers and theologians. One such contribution is his concept of freedom, which he explains and defends primarily in De Libertate Arbitrii (hereafter DLA), written somewhere between 1085 and 1090. Anselm's concept of freedom is important for a number of reasons. First, he argues for a definition of freedom which is significantly different from others found in the history of western thought. Second, in his investigation of freedom he makes use of a methodological procedure which in certain respects has striking similarities (though there are also important differences) to certain analytic techniques well-known today. And finally, the single definition that Anselm provides is intended to include in its compass two major and seemingly different senses of ‘freedom’.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , September 1973 , pp. 297 - 306
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1973

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References

page 297 note 1 According to the chronology established by Schmitt, F. S., ‘Zur Chronologie der Werke des M. Anselm von Canterbury,’ Revue Bénédictine, XLIV (1932), pp. 322–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The date that Schmitt gives for the Monologion is 1076 and for the Proslogion 107–78.

page 297 note 2 De Veritate, I. The translation here and elsewhere throughout the paper is that of Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson in the volume they edited entitled, Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1967)Google Scholar, hereafter cited as TFE. The present quotation is found on p. 92.

page 298 note 1 Cf. De Veritate, VI and VII.

page 298 note 2 Plato, Laches, 191e.

page 298 note 3 DLA, III.

page 299 note 1 DLA, I (TFE, p. 322).

page 299 note 2 Cf. De Actis cum Felice Manichaeo, II, iii and De Libero Arbitrio, I, xvi, 35. to Schmitt, F. S., Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1946–1961), vol. I, p. 207n.Google Scholar

page 299 note 3 Loc. cit.

page 299 note 4 How Anselm can maintain all this without inconsistency will become of what is said in section three below.

page 299 note 5 DLA, I (TFE, p. 323).

page 300 note 1 Cf. DLA, VIII; cf. also Cur Deus Homo?, II, i; and De Conceptu Virginali et Originali Peccato, XII.

page 300 note 2 DLA, II (TFE, p. 124).

page 301 note 1 This example was suggested to me by Kenneth Kennard, to whom I am indebted for many helpful suggestions on this paper.

page 301 note 2 Cf. DLA, III.

page 302 note 1 In the case of God self-determination is compatible with an absolute impossibility ever to do anything unjust. This is because God is the supreme being, ruler over all and subject to none. Hence even the impossibility for him to sin comes a se. With creatures, however, it is a different story. If there were no possibility that they could ever sin, then the just deeds which they performed could not be thought of as self-determined but could only be regarded as resulting from a necessity of nature, and thus not primarily the responsibility of the creature but of the creator.

page 302 note 2 DLA, III. One should not place too great an emphasis on the fact that the word ‘keep’ is used in the definition rather than ‘choose’ or ‘do’ for in De Veritate, XII, Anselm explains that the only way to keep rectitude is to choose, and that it is the same act by which rectitude is willed and kept.

page 302 note 3 Cf. De Conceptu Virginali et Originali Peccato and especially De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio.

page 303 note 1 Cf. Austin, J. L., ‘Ifs and Cans,’ Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 177 f. As is well-known, Austin distinguished opportunity and ability as two ‘restricted senses’ of ‘can’ and he speaks of the inclusive sense as ‘the “all-in” sense’.Google Scholar

page 303 note 2 DLA, IV (TFE, p. 129).

page 304 note 1 Cf. Cur Deus Homo? II, x.

page 304 note 2 Cf. De Concordia, III, xii.

page 305 note 1 These designations are ones used by Adler, M., The Idea of Freedom (Garden City, N.Y.: Double-day & Co., 1958), vol. I, pp. 167 ff. and passim.Google Scholar

page 305 note 2 ibid. p. 136

page 306 note 1 Cf. DLA, XIV (TFE, pp. 143–4).