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Against deliberation restrictions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

GARRETT PENDERGRAFT
GARRETT PENDERGRAFT*
Affiliation:
HUTE Division (CAC 300), Pepperdine University, 24255 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, CA, 90263-4225, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Traditional views about God and about deliberation seem to imply that we need a deliberation restriction on the concept of divine omniscience. I will argue, however, that this deliberation restriction is both irrelevant and unnecessary. It is irrelevant because there is no time at which God needs to deliberate; and it is unnecessary because even if God does deliberate, it's possible for him to do so while knowing what the results of that deliberation will be. And because this possibility of deliberating despite knowing the results holds for deliberation in general, my argument provides useful (and perhaps surprising) results not only for discussions of the divine attributes, but also for broader discussions of deliberation itself.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 341 - 357
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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