On some religious traditions, there are obligations to believe certain things. However, this leads to a puzzle, since many philosophers think that we cannot voluntarily control our beliefs, and, plausibly, ought implies can. How do we make sense of religious doxastic obligations? The papers in this issue of Religious Studies Archives present four responses to this puzzle. The first response denies that we have doxastic obligations at all; the second denies that ought implies can. The third and fourth responses maintain that we have either indirect or direct control over our beliefs. Collectively, they represent a number of plausible ways out of this paradox.

Elizabeth Jackson

• Introduction: The Ethics of Religious Belief, Elizabeth Jackson.
• Salvation without Belief, Daniel Speak, Religious Studies, Volume 43 Issue 2 (2007), 229–236.
• Christianity and the Ethics of Belief, Brian Zamulnski, Religious Studies, Volume 44 Issue 3, (2008), 333–346.
• Irresistibility, Epistemic Warrant, and Religious Belief, Richard Lints, Religious Studies, Volume 25 Issue 4, (1989), 425–433.
• Pascal on Self-Caused Belief, Stephen T. Davis, Religious Studies, Volume 27 Issue 1, (1991), 27–37.
• Newman and the ‘Ethics of Belief’, M. Jamie Ferreria, Religious Studies, Volume 19 Issue 3, (1983), 361–373.
• Faith as a Doxastic Venture, John Bishop, Religious Studies, Volume 38 Issue 4, (2002), 471–487. 
• Non-Evidential Believing and Permissivism about Evidence: A Reply to Dan-Johan Eklund, Joshua Cockayne, David Efird, Daniel Molto, Richard Tamburro, and Jack Warman, Religious Studies, Volume 53 Issue 1, (2017), 87–95.