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Voluntary Provision of a Public Good in a Strategic Market Game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2015

Somdeb Lahiri
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Summary

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the mutual compatibility of voluntary provision of public good and strategic behavior of consumers in the market for private goods. We study the existence of equilibrium private provision of a public good within general strategic equilibrium framework with a finite number of players. The mechanism for the provision of public good follows the one due to Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and the trading mechanism for private goods follows the strategic market game with wash sales due to Dubey and Shubik (1986). The new result of the paper is the demonstration of existence of an equilibrium point in pure strategies for finite number of players. Due to the existence of trivial equilibria at which all markets are closed, equilibrium points are constructed as limits of sequences of ε- equilibria of perturbed games.

L'objectif de cet article est d'étudier la compatibilité entre la mise à disposition volontaire d'un bien public et les comportements stratégiques des consommateurs sur un marché avec des biens privés. Nous étudions l'existence d'un équilibre pour lequel la fourniture du bien public est réalisée de manière privée dans un modèle avec interactions stratégiques entre un nombre fini d'agents. Le mécanisme de fourniture du bien public s'inspire du modèle de Bergstrom, Blume et Varian (1986), et le mécanisme d'échange pour les biens privés relève des jeux de marché avec transactions blanches de Dubey et Shubik (1986). L'apport de cet article réside dans une démonstration d'existence d'un point d'équilibre en stratégies pures pour un nombre fini d'agents. Dans la mesure où les équilibres triviaux sont possibles, cet équilibre est construit comme la limite de séquences d'équilibres du jeu perturbé.

Keywords

strategic market gamepublic goodequilibrium pointsC72D43H41jeu stratégique de marchébien publicpoint d'équilibreC72D43H41
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 79 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 45 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2013 

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